POPULISM AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: METHODS OF SELECTING CANDIDATES FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE

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The institutional design through which democracies choose nominees who compete to become a nation’s chief executive is among the most consequential features in the design of democratic elections. Yet there is surprisingly little scholarship that explores this issue in detail. This Article provides both historical perspective on the evolution over time of the nomination process in the United States and comparative perspective on how other major democracies structure this process. The central organizing theme of this piece is the contrast between nomination processes that entail a central role for “peer review”—in which party leaders have a central voice in the selection of their parties’ nominees—and purely populist selection methods, in which ordinary voters completely control the selection of nominees and party figures have no special role.

The first half of the Article is historical and focuses on the United States. In the 1970s, the United States shifted almost overnight from the methods that had been used for nearly 200 years to select party nominees, in which official representatives of the political parties played the major role in deciding the parties’ candidates for President, to a purely populist mode (primaries and caucuses) for selecting presidential nominees. The consequences of this dramatic transformation have manifested themselves in recent presidential nomination contests. In this Part, we seek to show both how radical the change was that was made in the 1970s and yet how accidental, contingent, and inadvertent this transformation was. The “framers” of these changes did not actually intend to create the system with which we ended up, in which the primaries and caucuses completely determine the parties’ nominees.

The second half is comparative and explores how other major democracies structure the process of choosing party leaders and candidates for chief executive. This part shows that the U.S. system is an extreme outlier among major democracies: In no other democracy is the selection completely controlled by the mass of ordinary voters. Most other democracies use systems of pure peer review to select candidates for chief executive; or use systems that mix elements of peer review with popular participation; and in other ways continue to give official representatives of the parties much greater say than in the United States over the selection of the parties’ nominees for chief executive.

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This Article also contributes to the general analysis of the rise of populist politics in many democracies today by showing that the institutional design mechanisms for choosing party nominees and party leaders can enable or constrain how easily and quickly populist political forces are able to capture control of government.

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INTRODUCTION

The institutional framework and legal rules through which democracies choose the nominees who compete to become a nation’s chief executive (President or Prime Minister) are among the most important features in the institutional design of any democracy. Yet despite the considerable academic attention “the law of democracy” has received in the United States over the last twenty years, surpris-
ingly little scholarly focus has thus far been devoted to this fundamental attribute in the institutional design of American democracy. This lacuna is particularly striking because one of the most consequential and radical developments of the last fifty years in the way American democracy is structured is the fundamental change we made to the way the major party nominees for President are selected: the shift to a purely plebiscitary method in which primary elections (and a small dose of caucuses) completely determine the party’s nominees. Similarly, there is little comparative analysis and assessment of the different methods various established democracies use to structure the process of choosing the principal candidates for chief executive. Yet different selection methods inevitably have profound selection effects on the kind of people who choose to run; on the kind of political figures most likely to succeed in capturing nominations and office; and, most importantly, on how the resulting administration functions and the interests and political forces to which it is most likely to respond.

The primary aim of this Article is to provoke more widespread reflection about how best to design this crucial feature in the institutional framework of democracy. Precisely because the dramatic new system put in place in the United States nearly fifty years ago has remained largely unchallenged and unchanged since then, most Americans undoubtedly have come to take for granted that our current system of presidential primaries and caucuses is the “natural” or the only “democratic” way to select nominees for President. We seek to unsettle that notion by providing both historical and comparative perspective on this issue.

The secondary aim is to contribute to the more general debate over the rise of populist forms of politics in many parts of the world, including the United States and Europe, in the last several years. We seek to explore how different selection methods for party nominees might affect the likelihood that populists will gain office as a country’s chief executive.

1 There is a good deal of debate currently taking place over how precisely “populist politics” ought to be conceptualized or defined. For the work which has received the most attention and inherently links populism to a rejection of political pluralism, see JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM (2016). For a critique of Müller and a defense of a more expansive conception of populism, see Robert Howse, Populism—A Defense: Reflections on the History of Democratic Thought and Practice 2–9 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). For a recent review of Müller’s book applying its core analysis to identify the populist challenge to democratic constitutionalism in the United States, see Aziz Z. Huq, The People Against the Constitution, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1123 (2018). What we are primarily concerned with and about is illiberal, authoritarian populism of the right or left.
Part I chronicles the historical development within the United States of the different methods and institutional frameworks that have been used over time for selecting presidential nominees. This Part demonstrates that for most of American history until the 1970s, the selection system included a prominent role for what we call “peer review,” in which existing officeholders and party officials have significant weight in deciding who ought to represent the party as candidate for President. As Part I shows, the change in the 1970s can be characterized as the replacement of this peer review system with a purely “populist” one in which voters, through primaries and caucuses, completely determine the presidential nominees. After describing that shift, Part I also suggests that we did not so much intentionally choose this new “modern” populist system as we stumbled inadvertently into it.

Part II then turns to comparative perspectives on how other major democracies structure the process of choosing party leaders or candidates for chief executive. In line with the framework just described, the central divide is between more populist systems for making this choice versus ones in which peer review plays a significant role. Comparative perspective can help further destabilize the idea that our current populist system is the “natural” or uniquely “democratic” way of choosing nominees for the highest office. Part II therefore explores how party leaders and/or nominees for chief executive are chosen in many other established democracies, including the major democracies of Western Europe—the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy—as well as a diverse range of other large or important countries outside of Europe, such as Canada, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and Argentina.

The comparative analysis in Part II is driven by, and organized around, three major aims: (1) to identify the greater role that peer review plays in many democracies than in the United States in the selection of party leaders and candidates for chief executive; (2) to explore whether significant changes have taken place in the methods of making this choice over recent decades among major democracies, and whether those changes, where they exist, have tended to move as

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2 For clarification, and to distinguish this procedural sense of the term from the more general or substantive one referenced in describing the “secondary aim” of this Article in the previous paragraph, here, by “populist” (versus “peer review”), we are referring to selection methods by which the mass of ordinary voters choose a party’s candidate. Although we are thus using populism in two distinct senses in pursuing our primary and secondary aims, procedure and substance are far from unrelated, as it is a major point of this Article that populist selection methods are far more likely to result in populist candidates for chief executive than where some form of peer review is employed. See discussion infra Section II.G.
far in the direction of greater popular control as they have in the United States; and (3) to show the diversity of forms peer review has taken in other democracies, in recognition that different ways exist for building in a role for peer review in democratic systems.

Although this Article is on the surface primarily historical and comparative, we do not want to hide the normative concerns that animate it. We write to challenge the unexamined notion that our current populist system of candidate selection is the best way to choose the nominees who then compete in the general election for President. As some political scientists predicted shortly after we changed to this system in the 1970s, this populist selection method makes it more likely than in a peer review system that candidates who lack relevant experience will succeed, as will candidates who are more politically extreme.\(^3\) To the extent there remain small vestiges of peer review in our current system (e.g., superdelegates in the Democratic Party), we want to bolster the case for retaining that role. To the extent other democracies are contemplating moving further in the direction of more populist selection methods, perhaps in imitation of the United States or in response to the growing disillusionment with the mainstream political parties in Europe and elsewhere,\(^4\) we want to sound a cautionary note. One pragmatic benefit of peer review is that it can help to prevent populist leaders from capturing these parties and thereby putting such figures in a stronger position to win highest political office. And to the extent it is possible to catalyze a conversation about whether the United States should consider building back into our nomination processes a greater role for peer review, we hope to do so.

I

THE MOST POPULIST SELECTION METHOD IN THE WORLD: THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1970S

From the inception of contested presidential elections in the United States until the 1970s, we used a dramatically different system for selecting the leading candidates to compete in presidential general elections, including the nominees of the dominant political parties, once parties had become an established element in American democ-

\(^3\) See Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform 146–50 (1983).

\(^4\) See, e.g., Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy 2–13 (2013) (detailing a growing indifference and even hostility towards mainstream political parties in recent decades); Cas Mudde, Europe's Populist Surge, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2016, at 25, 30 (arguing that mainstream political parties in Europe must repoliticize the issues that have sparked a rise in populism to counter electoral indifference).
racy. Against this historical backdrop, the change that took place in the 1970s was both radical and, in many ways, unintended, as described below.

A. Evolution of the Presidential Selection Process

The Framers of the Constitution devoted substantial attention to the final stage of how the President ought to be chosen, settling ultimately on the Electoral College, with the hope that the structure of the Electoral College would have significant selection effects on the kinds of figures who would become President. They expected the Electoral College to produce a non-partisan system of presidential election in which pre-existing national reputations of the candidates would play the decisive role. But the Framers appear to have assumed that these potential credible candidates would emerge more or less spontaneously; they gave little thought to whether there was any need for a prior stage of filtering, in which potential candidates were somehow distilled down to a group from which voters would then choose by voting for the electors.

Yet starting in the early nineteenth century, the first form of peer review and two-stage selection process emerged. This was the congressional caucus, which arose as the de facto means of pre-selecting the most credible candidates for President in a world in which factional or partisan divisions had begun to emerge. In the caucus system, which lasted until 1824, members in Congress from a self-identified coalition—particularly, the Republicans—would privately come to agreement on the candidate they would endorse to the public as the representative of their views. The birth of the caucus system reflected, in part, the fear that without such a filtering device, too many candidates would run, the Electoral College would not be able to select a clear winner, and the selection of the President would thus

5 See James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development 41–42 (1979) (noting that the selection system the Framers implemented was predicated on non-partisan competition).

6 See id. at 86 (“[T]he Founders’ thought remains vague on just how individuals would earn the ‘continental reputations’ of which they spoke. Their view was that such reputations would naturally emerge in a regime in which national politics played a large, if not the dominant, role.”).

7 The first caucus was in 1800, when Republicans were united behind Jefferson as their presidential candidate, but were uncertain about their vice-presidential candidate, and so gathered in private to forge agreement on Aaron Burr. 2 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth 843 (Liberty Fund 1995) (1888).

8 See id.

9 See id. (detailing the use of congressional caucuses for the selection of presidential and vice-presidential nominees).
end up being decided in the House of Representatives, in which each state delegation had one vote.\textsuperscript{10}

The emergence of the caucus was ironic for two reasons. First, it reflected the blossoming of the kind of factional divisions that the Framers most feared and that the Constitution had been designed to preclude.\textsuperscript{11} Second, the Framers had specifically rejected having the President chosen by Congress, out of fear that the President would then be too dependent upon Congress.\textsuperscript{12} The entry of the caucus system at the “nomination” stage, however, generated precisely that kind of dependency. To be sure, defenders of the caucus system argued that members of Congress were merely making recommendations to the public, with the choice still in the hands of the voters.\textsuperscript{13} And while scholars have debated how decisive the choice of the congressional caucus actually was, that choice became the President in every general election from 1800 to 1816.\textsuperscript{14} For much of the first forty years, the role of the congressional caucus in the selection process meant that American government operated less as the system of separated powers originally envisioned and more as one involving a “congressionally-dominated fusion of legislative and executive powers.”\textsuperscript{15}

Critics derided the system as “King Caucus”\textsuperscript{16}—an elite capture of the presidential process—and the system began to lose its legitimacy. Within a couple decades, it was replaced by the national political party nomination conventions that, in vestigial form, remain with us today. Though the party convention was not invented by President Martin Van Buren, he quickly turned it into an enduring feature of American democracy, along with his brilliant creation and legitimation of the mass, national political party.\textsuperscript{17} Of particular relevance here, Van Buren had concluded that, in the vacuum created by the demise of the congressional caucus as a way of filtering presidential

\textsuperscript{10} See id. at 842–44 (detailing the evolution of the nomination process and its response to decreased political consensus and increased desire for public participation).

\textsuperscript{11} See CZER, supra note 5, at 77 (“Virtually all the Founders associated parties with seditious bodies.”).

\textsuperscript{12} See, e.g., id. at 65, 82.

\textsuperscript{13} See id. at 77 (recognizing that early advocates of permanent political parties saw them as vehicles for ordinary voters to influence the nomination process).

\textsuperscript{14} Id. at 117.


\textsuperscript{16} CZER, supra note 5, at 125.

\textsuperscript{17} The first national conventions were held in 1831, by the Anti-Masons and the National Republicans (who soon became the Whigs). In 1832, another national convention adopted the Whig nominations. In 1836, the Jacksonian Democrats selected through a national convention, but their opponents did not. But by 1840, all significant parties had come to use the national convention system. See, e.g., JAMES S. CHASE, EMERGENCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTION, 1789–1832, at 292–94 (1973).
nominees, competition for the presidency had devolved into a system of highly personalized and factional politics which generated too many candidates and more extreme, demagogic campaign appeals, as individual candidates fought to find ways to distinguish their personal brands.\footnote{C\textsc{e}aser, supra note 5, at 132, 136.} Unified, national political parties and party nominating conventions were thought to be vehicles for fostering broad consensus by forcing compromise among cross-cutting cleavages and reining in the role of personalized politics. By 1836, “the idea of partisan nominations was never again seriously challenged; it became part of the living constitution.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 127.}

Though the conventions purportedly involved a larger and more representative group of selectors than the congressional caucus, the reality was that state and local party leaders effectively controlled the conventions and the nomination process. They had considerable capacity to influence the choice of delegates, who were chosen by means like a party caucus, district convention, state convention, executive committee, or some combination of these and similar methods. These party leaders also led their own state delegations and had substantial practical control over how their states’ delegations voted.\footnote{For one description, see L\textsc{e}on E\textsc{p}stein, Political Parties in the American Mold 90 (1986).} Party leaders, who included state and national officeholders, had long-standing ties to their parties and were professional politicians.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} Thus, despite opening up the selection process to greater participation through the nominating conventions, the dominance of these state and local party leaders continued to provide a mechanism of peer-review filtering of potential nominees, albeit in more attenuated and inclusive form than the congressional caucus.

Once created, the party convention system did not face any significant change until 1912, with the advent of the Progressive Era’s press for direct primaries as a general means of choosing party nominees for all levels of election.\footnote{See \textit{C\textsc{e}aser}, supra note 5, at 220.} That movement introduced a limited role for a few direct presidential primaries to choose convention delegates.\footnote{See \textit{id.} (noting that Progressives such as Woodrow Wilson advocated for primaries at a national level, but only a handful of individual states adopted them as a means to select delegates for the national party convention).} But in hindsight, what is most remarkable is the limited imprint the direct primary movement had on the presidential nomina-
tion process, given how successful that movement turned out to be for elections at virtually every other level.\footnote{Id. at 221; see also Epstein, supra note 20, at 169–70.}

The direct primary was introduced as an element—but just an element—in the nomination system on behalf of former President Theodore Roosevelt’s pursuit of the nomination in 1912. Disenchanted with his handpicked successor, William Howard Taft, Roosevelt, who had been President from 1901 to 1909, decided to challenge Taft in 1912. Yet Roosevelt understood that by this time President Taft had control of the party apparatus.\footnote{See Geoffrey Cowan, Let the People Rule: Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of the Presidential Primary 83–84 (2016) (detailing how Roosevelt’s efforts in helping Taft win the nomination in 1908 precluded Roosevelt from securing the nomination in 1912).} To circumvent the party establishment, Roosevelt and his allies pressed states to adopt the direct primary for choosing delegates to the Republican Party convention, at the same time as the movement for direct primaries for choosing nominees for other offices was gaining steam. This support for increasing the direct role of “We the People” was purely strategic; before being convinced this was his only path to the nomination, Roosevelt had opposed direct primaries and other forms of more popular democracy.\footnote{See id. at 42 (noting that Roosevelt “refused to embrace popular democracy as the cornerstone of the progressive agenda”); id. at 43 (quoting Roosevelt’s private letter remarking that every real supporter of democracy “acts and always must act on the perfectly sound (although unacknowledged, and often hotly contested) belief that only certain people are fit for democracy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). By the time he was running against Taft and pressing for primaries, he gave widely-noticed speeches, including one he called “The Right of The People to Rule,” in which he asserted: “The great fundamental issue now before the Republican Party and before our people can be stated briefly . . . It is: Are the American people fit to govern themselves . . . ? I believe they are. My opponents do not.” Id. at 99.} Nonetheless, it is no surprise that Geoffrey Cowan, one of the architects of the Democratic Party’s post-1968 move to the “modern” system in which presidential primaries completely determine the party’s nominee, has recently celebrated Roosevelt’s role in inaugurating the first presidential primaries. Responding to this pressure from Roosevelt and his allies, thirteen states ended up choosing their delegates through the direct primary for the 1912 Republican convention.\footnote{See id. at 1.}

From this point until the 1970s, our presidential nomination process is best understood as what scholars have characterized as a “mixed system.” Primary elections to choose delegates from some states became an element in the process, alongside the continuing role for local, state, and national party figures selected in the more tradi-
tional ways. Although winning a primary could influence the selection process, the dominant power to determine the nominees continued to rest with the traditional party figures.\footnote{In 1952, the American Political Science Association surveyed each state party organization in the country to find out how they selected delegates to the conventions and who effectively controlled that process. In carefully reviewing that survey data, the authors of *The Party Decides* concluded “that most party organizations were sufficiently insulated from popular pressures that the selection of delegates to the party conventions—and hence the choice of party nominee—was dominated by insiders.” *Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform* 118 (2008) [hereinafter *The Party Decides*].}

Indeed, one might expect that once primaries were introduced into the system for Roosevelt, the pressure for the direct primary would only gain momentum, particularly in light of the soon-to-be common use of the direct primary to choose nominees for other federal and state offices. Yet the presidential nomination process continued to resist the forces of complete populist control.

For instance, President Woodrow Wilson formally proposed in his first State of the Union address in 1913 that Congress enact a national primary law, because he believed a more empowered presidency was necessary to enable the American governance system to function effectively and that direct primaries were a means towards that end.\footnote{See *Howard L. Reiter, Selecting the President: The Nominating Process in Transition* 3 tbl.1.1 (1985). Epstein reports that twenty-six states, not twenty, used some form of primary. *Epstein, supra* note 20, at 91. The difference in these numbers probably reflects the range of structures that can arguably be considered some form of primary.}

But this proposal went nowhere. And even in 1916, at the high-water mark for presidential primaries in that era, when twenty states used some form of a presidential primary and more than half the delegates for each party’s convention were selected through a primary, these primaries were not the primaries of today.\footnote{See *Epstein, supra* note 20, at 91; *The Party Decides, supra* note 28, at 113.}

Under many of these primary laws, state party leaders could still control their delegations by rules that permitted delegates to be elected as “unpledged” or to support “favorite son” candidates (the state’s senator or governor, typically) who would be abandoned at the convention, as the party figures then bargained and negotiated over the serious nomination options.\footnote{See *Epstein, supra* note 20, at 91 (noting the decline in importance of primaries following 1920 and the continued role of party leaders in the nomination process).}

And by 1920, enthusiasm for the direct primary as part of the presidential candidate selection process had dissipated. Primaries settled into a contained element in the system while the dominance of the party organization re-solidified.\footnote{See *Epstein, supra* note 20, at 91 (noting the decline in importance of primaries following 1920 and the continued role of party leaders in the nomination process).} After 1920, only twelve to eighteen states in various years used some form of primary to select dele-
Indeed, we suspect most readers will be surprised to learn that, as late as 1968, only fourteen states used primaries; they selected 37% to 38% of the delegates, well less than the majority needed to control the choice of nominee.

The conventional negative story about this “old” system is that a cadre of party bosses got together in smoke-filled back rooms to choose the parties’ nominees. But whether that characterization was accurate at one time, the mixed system for nominations in the twentieth century also functioned in considerably more complex and nuanced ways. In this system, the role of the popular primaries and that of the party figures ended up performing a kind of checking and balancing function on each other’s influence. The institutional party figures continued to have incentives to put their weight behind candidates likely to hold the party’s factions together, run a competitive election, govern effectively, and reflect the party’s general ideology. But primaries also kept the system from being too closed, and enabled outsiders to challenge existing party hierarchy and orthodoxy, thus forcing the parties to remain responsive, at least up to a point. No single institutional designer sat down in a single moment of synoptic rationality to create the “perfect” mix of populist and peer-review sources of power; as often happens with democratic institutions, this system emerged from competing pressures over time. Yet we believe the mixed system functioned surprisingly well.

The selection effects of this mixed system were also balanced in a complex way. Under this system, some candidates chose to “run” on the inside track and make their appeal primarily or even exclusively to the party figures who controlled convention delegates. For instance, the Democrats nominated Adlai Stevenson in 1952, even though he had not run in any primary. The Democrats did so despite the fact that Senator Estes Kefauver had won eleven of the twelve Democratic primaries he entered.

Others effectively took advantage of the outside track of primaries to demonstrate their popular appeal and show skeptical party leaders that they could win votes—as when John F. Kennedy won the West Virginia primary in May 1960 and proved that a Catholic could

33 Reiter, supra note 30, at 3 tbl.1.1. The one exception is the Democratic Party convention of 1956, when twenty states used primaries of some form. Id.
34 Id. Again, there is also some discrepancy in number between the sources on exactly how many states used primaries. Some sources report sixteen to seventeen states as using primaries in 1968. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 91.
35 Cowan, supra note 25, at 293.
win votes even in heavily Protestant areas.\textsuperscript{36} Even an insurgent candidate, like Barry Goldwater in 1964, could successfully work the mixed system.\textsuperscript{37} But no candidate could succeed without also convincing enough institutional party figures throughout the country that they would be credible figures the party could support. In 1960, for example, Kennedy won only seven primaries.\textsuperscript{38} Personal appeal to voters in primaries mattered, but so did the ability to put together coalitions within the party. And party figures could bring to bear more personal knowledge than voters of how candidates actually functioned in their role as officeholders, which potentially could weed out nominees temperamentally unsuited to governing. When candidates ran in the primaries, they were thus always constrained to keep party regulars on board too.

Whether candidates emphasized more of an “inside” or “outside” strategy to the nomination, the net effect of this mixed system was to keep the political parties (meaning party leaders from the national, state, and local levels) in control. As the most thorough recent study concludes about the convention process in the decades before it collapsed, in no nomination contest “was a party forced by strong candidates with large popular followings to choose a nominee it didn’t want.”\textsuperscript{39} And, “[w]ith the exception of the Republicans in 1964 and the Democrats in 1968, parties consistently attempted to find candidates who were broadly acceptable to party groups and able to compete well in the general election.”\textsuperscript{40} In other words, while the mixed system titrated peer review with a degree of populism, the power of peer review remained dominant.\textsuperscript{41}

Thus, for the course of American history until the 1970s, the selection of credible nominees for the presidency typically involved a high degree of control and peer review by national, state, and local party leaders from throughout the country. “[P]arty leaders retained

\textsuperscript{36} See \textit{The Party Decides}, supra note 28, at 125–26 (noting that, although Kennedy was popular among party leaders, they originally felt they could not nominate him because of his religion).

\textsuperscript{37} See \textit{id.} at 142 (detailing Goldwater’s political rise in 1964).

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Id.} at 123–25.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Id.} at 144.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id.} at 145.

\textsuperscript{41} Some scholars did argue in the 1950s that the parties’ role in the conventions had already been weakened and that more populist forces had already taken control of the process. \textit{See}, e.g., William G. Carleton, \textit{The Revolution in the Presidential Nominating Convention}, 72 Pol. Sci. Q. 224, 224 (1957). For a later reflection of this view, see also \textit{Reiter}, supra note 30, at 124, 141. The analysis in \textit{The Party Decides} rejects this view and provides strong empirical analyses for the opposite conclusion. \textit{See The Party Decides, supra note 28.
most of their customary power over presidential nominations,” even as the precise form of this peer review evolved from selection by a small caucus in Congress to nominating conventions that eventually created a partial role for direct popular input. Even in the mixed system that emerged in 1912 and endured until the 1970s, peer review always played a central role in determining the major party presidential nominees.

B. Stumbling into the “Modern” System

This long-standing peer-review system was destroyed in the aftermath of the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. In its place was erected what has been called a pure “plebiscitary” system of selection. This dramatic change took place almost overnight. And in many ways, it was unintended; indeed, it transpired despite the objective of at least some of its architects to forestall exactly the changes that their recommendations nonetheless brought about. Within less than a decade, the American system had abandoned nearly two hundred years of a peer-review selection system and replaced it (somewhat inadvertently) with a populist one. It is that system that now makes possible the nomination by a major party of a figure like Donald Trump.

The catalyst for re-examining the nomination process, of course, was the disastrous 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, where the Democratic Party was torn asunder by political conflict, primarily over the Vietnam War. Outside the convention hall, national television showed violent confrontations between Mayor Daley’s police force and tens of thousands of anti-war demonstrators. Inside the Convention, some Democrats—particularly young, anti-war ones—were outraged that the Convention chose the establishment candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, whom President Johnson had bullied into supporting the war—despite the fact that Humphrey had not won any primaries and that the party caucuses he did win were

42 Epstein, supra note 20, at 91.
43 See id. at 90–95 (discussing the evolution of the system from 1832 to 1968 and its transition from a pure to mixed system).
44 Id. at 95.
46 For a description of the overall context of the 1968 Democratic Party convention and the turmoil surrounding it, see Polsby, supra note 3, at 9–32.
47 Id. at 30–33.
based on the opaque and obscure selection structure then in existence.\textsuperscript{48}

To appease the critics of his nomination, Humphrey agreed to a reform commission, eventually known as the “McGovern-Fraser Commission”—which turned out to be dominated by anti-war party reformers\textsuperscript{49}—to make recommendations for reforming the nomination process for the 1972 Convention.\textsuperscript{50} These recommendations, which the Democratic National Convention accepted, led to the most centralized imposition ever by the national party of rules on the state parties for how they could select delegates to the Convention.\textsuperscript{51} The Supreme Court then held that the Convention had the legal power to tell the state parties how they could select their delegates.\textsuperscript{52} These top-down rules, described in a bit more detail below, were designed to open up participation in the nomination process.\textsuperscript{53}

Overstating the immediacy and significance of the changes made in the aftermath of the Commission’s recommendations would be tough to do. As the author of the most thorough study of this reform process, Bryan Shafer, puts it, these changes brought “the arrival of a revolutionary change in the mechanics of presidential selection, the greatest systematically planned and centrally imposed shift in the institutions of delegate selection in all of American history.”\textsuperscript{54} A mere four years later, by the time of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, every state had amended its delegate selection rules and abandoned the mixed primary system it had used for decades. “Along

\textsuperscript{48} See \textit{The Party Decides}, supra note 28, at 157 (explaining that Humphrey did not enter any primaries because he did not want to confront anti-war protesters, and that he “avoided even giving speeches in states that were holding primaries”); \textit{Kamarck}, supra note 45, at 13–14 (discussing the process through which Humphrey was nominated). Theodore White famously described Humphrey as having been nominated “in a sea of blood.” \textit{Polsby}, supra note 3, at 33.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Kamarck}, supra note 45, at 14.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{The Party Decides}, supra note 28, at 158.

\textsuperscript{51} See \textit{Polsby}, supra note 3, at 55 (stating that the guidelines introduced a “new order of . . . centralized control to the selection of state delegations to the national party conventions”).

\textsuperscript{52} See \textit{Cousins v. Wigoda}, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), which upheld the power of the national credentials committee at the 1972 Democratic Convention to exclude delegates from Illinois that had been certified as the state’s delegates but chosen under state rules that conflicted with the new rules the DNC had now established. In a later case analogous to a Supremacy Clause case for political parties, the Court upheld the power of the DNC to exclude delegates selected under state party rules that conflicted with the rules of the DNC. \textit{Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette}, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).

\textsuperscript{53} See \textit{The Party Decides}, supra note 28, at 47 (stating that the Commission “recommended that the selection of delegates . . . be opened up to full and timely participation by ordinary voters”).

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Byron E. Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics} 4 (1983).
the way, and perhaps most crucially, the official party had been erased from what was still nominally the party’s nomination process.”

Under the new rules, the number of party leaders and elected officials at the conventions decreased dramatically. As one commentator put it: “In less than four years, the Democratic Party discarded 130 years of political tradition.”

Almost overnight, the United States moved toward a purely plebiscitary selection process. In 1968, the primaries had bound 36% of the delegates to each convention; just four years later, the primaries bound 58% of the Democratic delegates and 41% of the Republican ones, and by 1976, two-thirds of the Democratic delegates and more than half of the Republican ones were bound. By 1976, more than thirty states were using presidential primaries (today, more than forty states use primaries). Prior to the 1970s shift, primary elections were mechanisms for demonstrating electability to party leaders; in the new system, primaries directly determined delegate votes. “In the old system, candidates worked through the party regulars who habitually attended a caucus; in the new system, candidates [try] to flood party caucuses with their own people.”

Among other effects, the greater number of candidates who run today signal the loss of party control, as “[p]arty statesmen and spokesmen [are] replaced by ‘cause candidates’ espousing ideology (McGovern), the views of a discrete group (Jackson), and by ‘anti-politics candidates’ trumpeting political independence (Carter).” Primary challenges to sitting presidents have also become more common.

But strikingly, this radical change to one of our most important democratic institutions was not the intended aim of many reformers, as the major studies of the post-1968 “reforms” have concluded. Indeed, these changes were, ironically, exactly the opposite of their intent. The Commission did not seek to create a primary-dominated selection system that essentially eliminated the voice of the institu-

55 Id. at 6.
57 Id. at 236.
58 Polsby, supra note 3, at 64 tbl.2.5.
59 THE PARTY DECIDES, supra note 28, at 160.
60 Lengle, supra note 56, at 239.
61 See id. at 239–40 (listing challenges to sitting presidents that were “made possible by the proliferation of primaries”).
62 See, e.g., THE PARTY DECIDES, supra note 28, at 161 (asserting that the members of the commission “did not fully intend the changes that their reforms engendered,” including the “marginalization of the traditional party leadership”); KAMARCK, supra note 45, at 15 (stating that, according to Shafer, “this outcome was largely unanticipated by the Democratic National Committee” (citing SHAFER, supra note 54, at 387)).
tional party figures altogether. In fact, the Commission wanted to save the party through reforms that would maintain a critical role for the party itself.

Among the Commissioners was Austin Ranney, for example, a prominent political scientist who throughout his career had aimed to strengthen the parties, not hollow them out. He described the mismatch between what the Commission had meant to do and what happened in fact when its recommendations were implemented:

[T]he McGovern-Fraser commission expected to achieve several worthy goals—and received some rude shocks after the guidelines were implemented. For one example, most of the commissioners strongly preferred a reformed national convention to a national presidential primary or a major increase in the number of state presidential primaries. And we believed that if we made the party’s non-primary delegate selection processes more open and fair, participation in them would increase greatly, and consequently the demand for more primaries would fade away. But quite the opposite has happened.63

What, then, had the Commission actually intended to do? And how did we end up instead with our current primary-dominated system?

The reforms largely sought to preserve the legitimacy of the party by making the caucus system more accessible, transparent, and open; until then, it had been governed by baroque rules designed to enable only party insiders to participate.64 Up until then, the caucuses were often open only to those who held party office.65 Some states chose delegates an entire year or even two before the presidential election.66 Even when the caucuses were nominally open, those who were not party officials had a hard time finding out where and when the caucuses were being held; in some cases, different parts of the state might caucus on different days.67

63 Austin Ranney, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America 205–06 (1975).
64 See Epstein, supra note 20, at 90–95 (describing the evolution of the presidential nomination system between 1832 and 1980); Kamarck, supra note 45, at 7–12 (explaining the old presidential nominating system that was controlled by the parties); Polsby, supra note 3, at 34–35 (stating the goals and mandate of the Commission).
65 Kamarck, supra note 45, at 15.
66 The Party Decides, supra note 28, at 160.
67 See Epstein, supra note 20, at 90 (asserting that “public interest was often limited and readily discouraged by the scheduling of caucuses at inconvenient times and places”); Kamarck, supra note 45, at 15 (explaining that even if caucuses were not formally closed, “the lack of publicity surrounding them made it difficult for all but the most intrepid and well organized to attend”).
Under the new rules, if states were going to use local caucuses or state conventions to select delegates, the process had to be open to all who claimed to be party members; the meeting times had to be widely publicized (a significant change) and they had to be held the same year as the presidential election. If states used primaries, they now had to be “candidate primaries”—meaning the name of the presidential candidate, rather than the potential delegate, would be listed. But the McGovern-Fraser Commission was not seeking to increase the role of primaries, nor to reduce that of the institutional party’s role. The aspiration was that the recommended reforms would legitimate a continuing central role for the institutional party.

Yet as these new rules were implemented, they brought about the dramatic changes described above. Instead of opening up caucuses and conventions, the state parties—first on the Democratic side, then the Republican—responded by rapidly expanding the role of primaries, which had the effect of putting the nomination in the hands of primary voters once a majority of delegates were selected that way. Apparently, Democratic state parties were worried that if they failed to implement the new rules properly, their delegations would be subject to credentials challenges (of which there had been many at the 1972 Democratic Convention). Party leaders in many states thought primaries would be simpler and safer. Of course, even the remaining caucuses were no longer controlled by party insiders.

Republicans were pulled down the same path, partly because many states in which Democrats controlled the legislature passed laws creating a primary for both parties. And as more open and participatory Democratic processes attracted greater media attention, Republicans felt the need to move in the same direction.

To see how the Democratic Party stumbled into such a consequential change in democratic-institutional design is dispiriting. As Shafer concluded, the committee members tended to overlook “practical effects in formally codified rules,” which contributed to “the rapid and quiet acquiescence of these members in reforms which purported to alter the entire structure of national party politics.” Then, when the recommendations came to the DNC for approval, they also

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68 See Polsby, supra note 3, at 40–52 (providing the official guidelines created by the Commission).

69 See The Party Decides, supra note 28, at 159–60 (explaining that, if a state used a primary to select delegates to the nominating convention, those “delegates had to be awarded to candidates on the basis of voter support for that candidate”).

70 See Polsby, supra note 3, at 55 (stating that state party leaders had the burden of proving they complied with the requirements, leaving them open to credentials challenges).

71 Shafer, supra note 54, at 385.
failed to receive careful scrutiny, because the spectre of the 1968 nightmare loomed large. As one participant said: “There was still a lot of concern for having a nice, orderly, unified National Convention. These rules would help to do that, but if there was foot-dragging on party reform, there would be disaffection on the left, and that would bring 1968 back, only worse.”

In characterizing the post-1968 changes as so consequential, we must acknowledge the partially dissenting (but widely misunderstood) view expressed in a frequently cited book, The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform. There an influential quartet of political scientists argue that, after the initial shock of the 1970s reforms, the parties have figured out once again how to assert their control over the outcome of the nomination process, notwithstanding the advent of the primary-dominated system. In their view, an informal “invisible primary” has emerged that recreates the bargaining dynamics of the party conventions in the prior mixed system. In this “invisible primary,” before the first formal primary takes place, “party elites” and “party insiders” effectively select the person who will in fact become the party’s nominee. If this claim is right, it could be taken to mean that the 1970s changes made less practical difference than might be thought because “the party” still effectively determines its nominees.

But this interpretation is, first of all, a misunderstanding of The Party Decides. For one, “the party” that purportedly decides in the “invisible primary” is not the traditional party establishment from the days of meaningful peer review. The authors redefine “the party” to include not just elected officials and formal party organizations, but also “religious organizations, civil rights groups . . . organizers, fundraisers, pollsters, and media specialists,” along with “citizen activists who join the political fray as weekend warriors.” Influential bloggers, political talk radio and cable TV hosts, and other influential actors are all part of “the party” in this account. Once the party is redefined this expansively, it is clear that any “invisible primary” operates very differently from the peer review of elected party officials that dominated in the old, mixed system of nomination.

72 Id. at 390.
73 The Party Decides, supra note 28, at 7 (“The reformers of the 1970s tried to wrest the presidential nomination away from [party] insiders and bestow it on rank-and-file partisans, but the people who are regularly active in party politics have regained much of the control that was lost.”).
74 See id. at 187.
75 See id. at 362–63.
76 Id. at 4.
77 Id.
Second, even with this extremely loose conception of “the party,” it is unclear whether the book’s claim is accurate. The authors concede that the Democratic candidates of the 1970s, McGovern and Carter, were not the choice of the party establishment and would not have been chosen but for their ability to figure out more quickly than others how to work the new populist-controlled nomination system.\footnote{Id. at 161–69.}

Dismissing the significance of these nominations as transitional cases, the authors then rested their case on only ten nomination contests from 1980 to 2004. In eight of these, they conclude “the party decided” the nominee, though they acknowledge two of those cases are questionable.\footnote{Id. at 175.} Nominations since then have been even less kind to their theory. The authors conceded at the time they wrote that if McCain were nominated in 2008 (as he was), that would “rank as a clear breakdown of party control” and be a “defeat” for their theory.\footnote{Id. at 339, 352.} And though they try to wriggle out a bit from the same conclusion concerning Obama’s nomination, they have to add an epicycle to pull that off: They call Obama’s nomination “unique” because “[t]he party changed its mind” after the voting had begun, with the Iowa caucus.\footnote{Id. at 346.} They candidly “confess that [they] did not anticipate this development” and call it “a problem” for their claim.\footnote{Id. at 347.}

And now we have 2016. Begin with the Democrats. If ever a party had decided in the invisible primary that supposedly now substitutes for the party convention, it was the Democrats with their not-so-invisible anointment of Hillary Clinton. Yet consider how close Bernie Sanders—a socialist and Independent who was not even a member of the Democratic Party, and was widely disliked by Democratic Party members of Congress and most of the party establishment—came to a coup against the party’s choice.\footnote{This was recognized back in January 2016, in Daniel W. Drezner, The Easy Test for ‘The Party Decides’ Suddenly Doesn’t Look So Easy, Wash. Post (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/01/26/the-easy-test-for-the-party-decides-suddenly-doesnt-look-so-easy/?utm_term=.184de78c8a34.} Had he won, it would be hard to imagine a more dramatic example of the populist-selection system completely displacing peer review.

Hard, but not impossible: because, of course, there is President Trump. Trump represents the ultimate triumph of the populist nomination process over any role for peer review or for the newly constituted “invisible primary” through which “the party” purportedly still decides on the nominee. As a reminder, Trump abandoned many of
the party’s traditional policies, had no prior experience in government or the military, became a Republican only in recent years, and had virtually no support before the voting began from any traditional sources of authority and leadership in the party. He was essentially an independent free agent who successfully hijacked the party label for his own candidacy. For the authors of The Party Decides, a central claim about why the (broadly conceived) party still controls nominations is that, even in the primary-controlled process, the parties are able to “resist candidates who are unacceptable to important members of the coalition, even when those candidates are popular with voters.”84 For the Republicans in 2016 and 2008, that has hardly been the case.85

Although most members of the DNC did not understand the consequences of the reforms they imposed on the state parties, and many members of the reform commission itself did not either, astute political scientists who were experts on the design of democratic election processes and the political parties sharply criticized these “reforms.”86 As this “modern” system was taking shape, leading political scientists resisted on the grounds that it “might also lead to the appearance of extremist candidates and demagogues who, unrestrained by allegiance to any permanent party organization, would have little to lose by stirring up mass hatreds or making absurd promises.”87

84 The Party Decides, supra note 28, at 339.
85 Using The Party Decides’ own accounting system and totaling up all the post-reform contested nominations, we can say that the (broadly conceived) party has succeeded in determining the nominee between nine to eleven times in the “modern” era, while insurgents, or the non-party candidates, have prevailed between seven to nine times. See The Party Decides, supra note 28, at 175 (providing accounting system). After this article was completed, we ran across a March 2016 essay in which Hans Noel, one of the co-authors of The Party Decides, concedes that, were Trump to be nominated, his nomination would obviously be at odds with the thesis of The Party Decides, because the party establishment “loathed” him. Indeed, Noel acknowledges that since 2000, the thesis of The Party Decides has not been borne out in four of the six races. He then suggests that maybe the thesis was wrong all along or, at the least, new thinking was required to figure out why the party leaders sometimes can coordinate in advance on the party nominee and other times not. Hans Noel, Why Can’t the G.O.P. Stop Trump?, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/opinion/campaign-stops/why-cant-the-gop-stop-trump.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share.
86 Even back in the 1880s, when the British Viscount, James Bryce, was studying the American system and the first primaries were introduced, Bryce speculated that if the primary system ever became national, it might “eliminate all aspirants except those who possess conspicuous popular gifts.” Bryce, supra note 7, at 850.
II
HOW OTHER MAJOR DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE CANDIDATES FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE

When Professor William Mayer surveyed the American literature and commentary in 2009 on peer review and the American nomination process, he concluded: “I cannot find a single, sustained attempt to defend the proposition that party leaders and elected officials deserve a larger role in what is clearly the most important decision the American parties make.” This Symposium attests that this picture is changing. But had Mayer looked overseas, he would already have seen a different vision.

Contrary to the abandonment in the United States of any formal role for peer review in selecting party nominees for President, several well-established democracies around the world continue to rely exclusively on peer review, while many others employ a mixed system in which elements of peer review continue to combine (often in fascinating ways) with a broader selectorate that usually consists only of formal party members but not the mass of ordinary voters.

Only a small minority of democracies has moved to mostly populist selection methods, but even there, the percentage of ordinary voters involved is far lower than in the United States. Moreover, as Section II.G demonstrates, important contextual differences between the United States and other democracies mean that, even in the few countries that have adopted populist selection methods, the party’s influence or control over the process remains greater than in the United States. In addition to peer review, where it exists, this second source of greater party influence also helps to prevent populist leaders from capturing major parties—as happened in the United States in 2016—and thereby decreases the likelihood of such figures becoming chief executives.

In what follows, we first explain why in certain (i.e., mostly parliamentary) democracies, the nominees who compete to become the nation’s chief executive are the major party leaders so that party leadership elections become the important selection contests. The core of this Part then describes and provides examples of countries that have adopted and currently employ each of the three main selection methods in turn. It also explains the reasons for the (non-universal) trend towards greater inclusivity that has led some democracies towards mixed systems of peer review and populism and others.

towards mostly populist methods. The Part concludes by suggesting how other, more general differences between the United States and many other countries in the law and practice of democracy tend to result in lesser selection effects in the latter, even where purely populist methods are adopted. Our analysis focuses on major parties both because this is still typically where chief executives come from, and because they, rather than minor parties, have been the main drivers of the general trend.

Part II illustrates that there is nothing “natural” or “inherent” in the idea of democracy that requires purely populist selection methods for choosing major-party candidates for chief executive, as revealed by the practices of major democracies around the world.

A. Selecting Party Leaders Versus Party Candidates for Chief Executive

In most parliamentary systems, a party’s candidate for chief executive (Prime Minister, Chancellor) is ex officio the party leader. There are no separate party leadership and candidate selection processes, but only the leadership contest which thereby doubles as the process for selecting its candidate for public office. In other words, party leaders are selected as candidates for chief executive. Indeed, quite frequently in parliamentary systems, a party leader becomes prime minister as the result of an intra-party leadership contest in between general elections—that is, without being personally approved for the highest public office by the electorate. On the other hand, especially in multiparty parliamentary systems, leaders of smaller parties are typically not—and so are not chosen as—candidates for prime minister, but rather as a potentially effective party spokesperson, opposition figure, or cabinet minister in a coalition government. With respect to the majority of parliamentary systems that fall into this category, therefore, this section focuses on selection methods in major party leadership contests.

By contrast, where selection processes for party candidate for chief executive are separate from party leadership contests, this section focuses on the former. With the United States as a notable exception, separate contests for party leader and party candidate for chief executive are more common in presidential and semi-presidential sys-

89 Emmanuel Macron, the French President, is of course one exception.
90 That is, even where minor parties have used more inclusive selection methods (because, for example, they have few elected officials), this has not generally had a “contagion effect” on the major parties in that country.
91 See infra Sections II.B.1, II.C.1, II.D.2 for the examples of Australia, the United Kingdom, and Israel.
tems of government. For example, in France, François Hollande ran successfully in the 2011 Parti Socialiste (PS) presidential primary against the then-party leader, Martine Aubry, among other candidates. In 2017, Nicolas Sarkozy, the former President of France and then-leader of the (newly renamed) right-of-center party, The Republicans, ran in its presidential primary and lost to former Prime Minister Francois Fillon.

Separate contests do sometimes exist, however, in parliamentary systems. The open primaries for the Italian center-left coalition’s candidate for prime minister in both 2005 and 2012 are the best-known examples, although they also occur in parties where the leadership position is incompatible with being a member of the government, as in Belgium.

B. Purely Peer Review Systems

Several democracies continue to rely exclusively on peer review to select candidates for chief executive.

1. Australia and New Zealand

In Australia, the mode of selecting the leader of the currently governing Liberal Party (and so the party’s candidate for Prime Minister) has been unchanged since 1965, and is, along with its National Party counterpart in New Zealand, perhaps the most resistant to populism. For in both countries, the leaders of these two center-right parties continue to be elected exclusively by their parliamentary peers and colleagues. The fusion of legislative and executive powers that such a “caucus” system contributes to bringing about is, arguably, less problematic in, and coheres better with, a parliamentary than a “separated powers” presidential form of government.

The election rules which promote the ease and frequency of changing
party leader (contests are held on average every two years) are also set exclusively by the parliamentary group and neither by statute nor by the extra-parliamentary party organization, as is common elsewhere.\textsuperscript{100}

Until 2013, the other major party in both countries, Labor (Australia) and Labour (New Zealand), followed suit in a solid regional rejection of the trend towards broader selectorates. In Australia, although the mode of selection had not changed in fifty years, its application has, for the overthrow of party leaders has become more frequent in the past decade, during which three serving Prime Ministers were ousted by successful leadership challenges.\textsuperscript{101} Following his own experience as first deposed and then reinstated leader/Prime Minister within three years, Kevin Rudd had Labor’s election rules changed in 2013 to require a supermajority of its MPs to force a leadership ballot and the use of a form of mixed voting system, described below, for selecting the party’s leader.\textsuperscript{102} Similarly in New Zealand, although the leader of the center-right National Party continues to be elected exclusively by its parliamentary caucus, for the first time in 2013, the Labour Party switched to a form of closed primary system that will also be described briefly below.\textsuperscript{103}

2. Germany and Brazil

In Germany, the method of selecting the party leader, and thereby its strongly presumptive candidate for Chancellor, is mandated by a statute, the Party Law of 1967.\textsuperscript{104} As part of the Basic Law’s commitment to “militant democracy,” state regulation of internal party democracy is the norm, if arguably somewhat outdated

\textsuperscript{100} See Gauja, supra note 97, at 191 (stating that “the party leader is selected exclusively by the parliamentary party group”).


\textsuperscript{102} See id. at 171–74 (detailing Kevin Rudd’s rise to power and subsequent influence over election policies).


\textsuperscript{104} Parteiengesetz [ParteienG] [Political Parties Act], July 24, 1967, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBl.] I at 149, §§ 6–11 (Ger.), translation at https://www.bundestag.de/blob/189734/2f4532b000e4071444a62f360416cac77/politicalparties-data.pdf.
in its conception.\textsuperscript{105} According to the Party Law, all party leaders (Chairpersons) are elected by delegates to the party’s national conference every two years.\textsuperscript{106} In April 2018, Andrea Nahles was elected leader of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) at the party’s convention by the votes of 414 delegates to 172 for her opponent. Here, the 586 peer reviewers reflect approximately 0.13\% of the SDP’s membership of 433,000, and a far tinier percentage of its ten million voters in last year’s general election.\textsuperscript{107} More typically, the parties reach consensus beforehand and present a united front at the conference with the “coronation” of the uncontested leader.\textsuperscript{108} Because the law does not in its terms stipulate that a party’s leader must also be its candidate for chancellor, the legal possibility of holding some form of primary for the latter exists. Although the center-left Social Democratic Party considered holding a primary in 2013 to determine the top candidate on its party list, given the presence of three politicians with perceived electoral appeal, it ultimately decided against it and in favor of automatic selection of the party leader. The smaller Green Party did hold such a primary in 2012, the first in Germany.\textsuperscript{109} Similarly, in Brazil, a presidential democracy, the major parties select their presidential candidates by the vote of delegates at the party conventions, with no role for rank-and-file members. The only exceptions are the Workers’ Party and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, which hold internal elections when there is more than one interested candidate within the party.\textsuperscript{110}


\textsuperscript{106} Parteiengesetz [ParteienG] [Political Parties Act], July 24, 1967, BGBl. I at 149, §§ 8–9 (Ger.).

\textsuperscript{107} See New Boss, New Plan, \textit{Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Tagesschau} [ARD: Tagesschau] [Apr. 22, 2018], https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nahles-spd-103.html (Ger.) (noting that there were also 38 abstentions, making a total of 624 valid votes); \textit{Angela Merkel’s Coalition Hopes Rise as SPD Votes for Talks}, \textit{The Week} (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.theweek.co.uk/germany/91103/angela-merkel-s-coalition-hopes-rise-as-spd-votes-for-talks (noting that the SPD has 433,000 members).

\textsuperscript{108} See Klaus Detterbeck & Ingo Rohlfing, \textit{Party Leader Selection in Germany, in Selection of Political Party Leaders}, supra note 96, at 77, 77 (describing how German parties attempt “to reach a consensus on a single candidate prior to the formal election” and then “coronate[]” them).

\textsuperscript{109} See id. at 91 (discussing the Green Party as an exception to the typical process).

3. **India and South Africa**

Among other parliamentary democracies, the two national liberation movements that transformed themselves into dominant ruling political parties after independence and democracy in India and South Africa respectively have both adhered to their traditional method for selecting their party leaders, which, while broader than the parliamentary caucus in Australia, nonetheless relies more or less exclusively on peer review.

The Indian National Congress still selects its party leader (Congress President) by the same method used to appoint Gandhi and Nehru, which is formally by a vote of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), comprised of approximately 1000 party members elected from state-level Pradesh Congress Committees.\(^\text{111}\) In practice, the highest executive and policymaking body of the party, the twenty-five member Congress Working Committee, together with the separate Congress Legislative Party (i.e., Congress Party MPs) as well as an incumbent Congress Party Prime Minister, if there is one, have significant influence on who is selected. In 1946, Nehru's selection as Congress President, engineered by Mohandas Gandhi in the face of factional rivalries, made certain his invitation by the outgoing colonial power to be first interim Prime Minister and ultimately incumbent Prime Minister of the newly independent nation.\(^\text{112}\) On Nehru's death in 1964, the then-Congress President, "kingmaker" K. Kamaraj (who was Nehru's choice for the post), refused to become Prime Minister himself but worked to have first Lal Bahadur Shastri, and then on Shastri's sudden death two years later, Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi, accepted as Prime Minister by the rest of the party leadership.\(^\text{113}\)

Since Indira Gandhi founded her own branch of the Congress Party, Congress (I), in 1978, soon to replace the “official” one, the position of President of Congress has been re-institutionalized as the effective leader of the Party and its strongly presumptive candidate for Prime Minister. Accordingly, between 1978 and 2004, Congress Party prime ministerial candidates were always also Congress


The exception is Sonia Gandhi, who has been Congress President since 1998. When she was in position to assume the prime ministership after the party’s electoral victory in 2004, she renounced it following controversy over her qualification to serve, as an Italian-born former non-Indian citizen. In her place, she recommended Manhoman Singh to the AICC, who became the first Congress Party Prime Minister not to be President since Indira Gandhi in 1966. In 2014, when Singh decided not to run for a third term as Prime Minister, Sonia Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee chose not to name a prime ministerial candidate before the general election, most likely for fear of tarnishing the future prospects of her son and “heir apparent,” Rahul Gandhi, in the face of almost certain defeat. Despite being the world’s largest party in terms of number of members, the other major national (and currently governing) party in India, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), selects its prime ministerial candidate by an even more exclusive peer review system of election by the twelve-person parliamentary party board, which consists of the party’s most senior leaders.

Similarly, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa continues to elect its leader (“President”), and thereby its candidate


116 See George Wright, Sonia Gandhi Declines Indian Prime Ministership, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/18/india.georgewright (documenting Sonia Gandhi’s decision to decline the position of prime minister).

117 See id. (documenting reports that Sonia Gandhi would back Manmohan Singh for prime minister).


for President of the country in the parliamentary general election,\(^{120}\) by a vote of its party elite. This takes place at the ANC’s National Conference, a five-yearly event at which approximately 5000 delegates out of the party’s 700,000 or so members elect the leader.\(^ {121}\) In 2007, Jacob Zuma defeated then-incumbent party leader and (term limited) South African President Thabo Mbeki by 2329 to 1505\(^ {122}\) and, then as incumbent President himself, was easily re-elected by 2983 votes to 991 for his opponent, party Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe.\(^ {123}\) In December 2017, the National Conference narrowly selected Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa to be Zuma’s successor as party leader and candidate for chief executive (his second and final term as the country’s President was scheduled to end in 2019) over the latter’s preferred candidate and former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The vote among the 4700 delegates was 2440 to 2261.\(^ {124}\)

C. Mixed Systems

While the democracies described above have not changed their selection methods in recent years and continue to rely exclusively on forms of peer review, others have, indeed, shifted theirs in the direction of greater inclusivity, but still retain a significant role for peer review. The result is a range of mixed systems, albeit somewhat different from the one in place in the United States between 1912 and 1972.

\(^ {120}\) Although the chief executive is termed President, and also serves as head of state unlike in standard parliamentary systems, in most other respects—there is no direct election of the chief executive, who is the leader of the largest party in Parliament and can be ousted from office by a vote of no confidence—South Africa is a parliamentary system. See, e.g., Anthony Butler, The State of the South African Presidency, J. Helen Suzman Found., Nov. 2013, at 4. See generally Christi van der Westhuizen, Working Democracy: Perspectives on South Africa’s Parliament at 20 Years (2014) (describing the development of the South African parliamentary system).


\(^ {124}\) Jason Burke, Cyril Ramaphosa Chosen to Lead South Africa’s Ruling ANC Party, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/cyril-ramaphosa-chosen-to-lead-south-africas-ruling-anc-party. In February 2018, Zuma was forced by the ANC to resign as President of the country (or face a motion of no-confidence in Parliament) and Ramaphosa succeeded him.
1. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has long been a two-party parliamentary system, consisting (since the early 1920s) of the center-right Conservatives and center-left Labour Party. This is due significantly to its first-past-the-post electoral system that standardly under-represents third and smaller parties relative to their proportion of the national vote. Although in recent years the complete dominance of the two main parties looked to have declined, with the growth and relative electoral successes of the regional Scottish National Party (now the leading party in Scotland), the Liberal Democrats, who were the junior partner in the coalition government with the Conservatives between 2010 and 2015, and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), to the surprise of some, it reasserted itself in the 2017 general election.

Prior to 1965, a famously opaque system was employed by the Conservative Party in which the leader “emerged” after consultations with the senior party figures. Due to dissatisfaction with the choice (the aloof, aristocratic Sir Alec Douglas-Hume) in many party circles that was compounded by electoral defeat, this system was replaced in 1965 by a series of ballots among Conservative MPs until a winner with both an absolute majority and a 15% margin of victory over the nearest rival was selected. This method continued until 1998, when the current system was introduced following the landslide electoral defeat of Tony Blair the previous year. Under the current system, the parliamentary party serves as the preliminary selectorate, winnowing the number of candidates down to two through successive ballots, with the final choice between them being made by the full party membership (of currently approximately 150,000 individuals) on a one-member, one-vote basis through a postal ballot. The selection of Theresa May as party leader and thereby Prime Minister after

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125 See generally, e.g., Richard Hayton & Timothy Heppell, The Presidentialization of Party Politics in the UK, in The Presidentialization of Political Parties, supra note 101, at 142 (providing a history of the two-party system in the United Kingdom throughout the twentieth century).
126 See id. at 143.
130 See id.
David Cameron’s resignation following the Brexit referendum in June 2016 emphasizes the continuing gatekeeping and control function of the parliamentary party. For first, the “populist” Boris Johnson surprisingly decided not to run, presumably for predicted lack of support among parliamentary peers, and second, the eventual runner-up quickly dropped out of the contest after the last ballot, leaving nothing for the mass membership to vote on.

Before 1980, the leader of the Labour Party was similarly elected exclusively by its MPs. In 1981, two years after the defeat and transfer of power to Thatcher, the party’s rules were changed to create an electoral college in which 40% of the vote went to affiliated trade unions, and 30% each to local Constituency Labour Party branches (CLPs) and to MPs, with an absolute majority of weighted votes needed to win at the special meeting attended by delegates. A conspicuous feature of this system was the monolithic “block voting” by delegates at the electoral college, with unions and CLPs typically mandating their delegates to vote as instructed. In 1993, following the party’s fourth general election defeat in a row since 1979, the new leader, John Smith, instigated a further change in the rules, granting equal votes in the electoral college to all three constituent groups and ending block voting in favor of individual voting by postal ballot. While enhancing the participation of individual union and CLP members, this change also obviously increased the influence of the far smaller number of MPs.

This system survived until 2014 when, under Ed Miliband, who had defeated his brother for the party leadership only with the help of trade union support, the electoral college was abolished in favor of a straight one-member (plus affiliates and registered supporters), one-vote system, with the winner being the first candidate to obtain 50%

132 See Angela Dewan & Lindsay Isaac, David Cameron to Resign Wednesday as Theresa May to Become British PM, CNN (July 11, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/11/europe/britain-politics-may-leadsom/index.html (reporting the election of Theresa May and questioning whether the process was democratic).

133 George Parker, How Michael Gove Forced Boris Johnson’s Surrender, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/26b55cfa-3eb5-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0.


136 Id.

137 See id.

138 Id. at 15.

139 See id.
of the votes cast, using several ballots if necessary. At a stroke, the influence of Labour MPs was drastically reduced from one-third of the total to, after the 2015 general election, 230 votes out of an electorate of nearly 550,000.

Under the current rules, however, the remaining form of peer review is that nominees are required to have the support of 10% of Labour MPs and Members of the European Parliament combined when there is a leadership vacancy, and 20% when there is a challenge to the incumbent. Whether the incumbent is also required to have such support among elected representatives was a central and crucial issue in the most recent leadership contest, in which Jeremy Corbyn was challenged following the Brexit referendum. The party’s National Executive Committee narrowly ruled that he did not need such support, a decision challenged in but upheld by the High Court. Given the massive vote of no confidence of 172 votes to 40 in Corbyn’s leadership by Labour MPs immediately after the Brexit vote, it was unlikely that he would have been able to muster the necessary 20% support. Accordingly, given this ruling and Corbyn’s subsequent overwhelming reelection in September 2016 despite this lack of support, a political consequence of the new rules is that the Parliamentary Labour Party had a “leader” foisted upon it for the first time. The differential extent and impact of peer review on the outcomes of the two parties’ leadership elections in 2016 could not be clearer.

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143 In light of Jeremy Corbyn’s somewhat fortuitous overcoming of the peer review hurdle in 2016, his supporters sought and gained a rule change in September 2017, reducing the required percentage of MPs and MEPs from 15 to 10 in the case of a vacancy. See Quinn, supra note 140.

144 On July 12, 2016 the NEC voted by 18–14 in a secret ballot that the incumbent leader was automatically entitled to appear on the ballot and not subject to the requirement of receiving the support of 20% of the party’s MPs and MEPs. This decision was upheld by a High Court judge in *Foster v. McNicol* [2016] EWHC 1966 (QB) [1, 50, 54].

The two major parties (as well as the Liberal Democrats), therefore, firmly adhere to the long-standing rule that the “leader” of the party is the person who leads the party in Parliament (“the parliamentary party”), and so must be a member of it—and, more specifically, of the House of Commons (an “MP”). But they also epitomize the recent shift to greater “intra-party democracy” in the selection of party leader/candidate for Prime Minister, as both have moved from the traditional process of exclusive selection by the parliamentary party to one giving a greater role to rank-and-file party members. Despite this, both parties maintain forms of peer review in the selection, although, as recent contests have illustrated, more so—or at least more effectively—with the Conservatives.

2. Japan

Japan also uses a mixed system for candidate selection, but one in which peer review continues to play a particularly significant role. Japan has a two- (or, probably more accurately, a one-and-a-half-) party parliamentary system, in which the dominant right-of-center Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been out of power only twice since its foundation in 1955 and has only once not been the largest party in the lower house. The name and identity of the second left-of-center party has fluctuated over the years, but from its foundation in 1998 until its recent effective dissolution in 2017, the mantle had fallen on the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

Prior to 1977, the President, or leader, of the LDP was selected by the parliamentary party alone. But a shift towards greater intra-party democracy was instigated in that year following the party’s gen-

146 See Ellis S. Krauss & Robert J. Pekkanen, The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, 69 J. ASIAN STUD. 5, 5–6 (2010). There was a Social Democratic Party-led government from 1993 to 1994 and a Democratic Party of Japan government from 2009 to 2012, the latter being the only time the LDP has not been the largest party in the lower house. Id. at 5.

147 See id. at 11. In 2016, the DPJ merged with two small left-of-center parties, the Japan Innovation Party and Vision of Reform, to form the new Democratic Party (Japan), but for the sake of convenience we refer to both as the DPJ. See, e.g., Linda Seig, Japan Opposition Parties to Merge with Eye on July Election, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-opposition/japan-opposition-parties-to-merge-with-eye-on-july-election-idUSKCN0VZ0XD; Four Members of Vision of Reform to Join New Party, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/?num=21026. During the 2017 general election, the DPJ imploded and was replaced as the main center-left, and largest opposition, party by the new Constitutional Democratic Party.

eral election setback in 1976, when the LDP failed to win an outright majority in the lower house for the first time. The current LDP and DPJ selection processes are largely similar: All party members have a vote, but both parties retain a highly significant role for peer review.

In both parties, leadership candidates must be incumbent MPs and have the support of at least twenty of their fellow parliamentary party members (in the LDP, party presidents are term-limited to two three-year terms). The LDP’s selectorate is comprised of all MPs plus all party members who have paid annual dues for three consecutive years. Although the precise allocations have varied slightly from contest to contest, in the first of the two rounds of voting, each MP has one vote and three votes are typically allocated to party members in each of the country’s forty-seven prefectures. In other words, one MP’s vote is equivalent to approximately 5000 ordinary party members’ votes. If no candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round, the top two candidates then face a run-off in which peer review fully controls: Only MPs vote.

In the DPJ, the selectorate consisted of party members and supporters, local councilors, approved party candidates for the next general election, as well as its sitting MPs. In the first round of the leadership election, each MP’s vote counted for 2 points; each approved candidate’s vote for 1 point; 141 points were distributed to candidates based on the voting of local councilors; and 409 points were distributed to the rank-and-file members in the prefectures, or just over half the total 760 points. If there was a run-off, only MPs and approved candidates voted in it.

3. Ireland

As Japan demonstrates, one of the fascinating ways peer review is given a significant role in some mixed systems is through the use of

149 See id.
150 See id. at 111–14 (describing the primary election processes for the LDP and DPJ).
151 See id.
152 See id. at 112–14.
153 See id.
154 There were an estimated 800,000 LDP party members in 2012. See, e.g., Editorial, What’s the LDP’s True Agenda?, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/03/23/editorials/whats-the-ldps-true-agenda. One in 5000 is calculated by dividing the 800,000 LDP party members in 2012 by 47, and then by 3.
155 See Narita, Nakai & Kubo, supra note 148, at 111 (detailing the two rounds of voting). In 2012, Shigeru Ishiba came top in the first round but without a majority, and then lost the parliamentary vote in the run-off to Shinzo Abe. Id.
156 Id. at 113.
157 Id. at 114.
one or another form of weighted voting. Ireland is an equally striking example. Ireland is a parliamentary republic with two parties of government, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, and two additional significant parties, Sinn Fein and Labor.158 Both major parties have in recent years switched from the traditional leadership selection process by parliamentary caucus alone to a closed primary system with weighted voting. Fine Gael, which is currently in power as a minority government, adopted its new system in 2002 and employed it for the first time in May 2017 following Enda Kenny’s resignation as party leader and Prime Minister.159 Fianna Fail instituted this new system after the election of current leader Micheal Martin in 2011, but has yet to employ it.160

Fine Gael’s system, contained in its party constitution, creates an electoral college divided into three parts: the parliamentary party, ordinary party members, and the party’s local councilors.161 The vote is heavily weighted in favor of peer review, in that the parliamentary party counts for 65%, party members 25%, and local councilors 10%.162 At the time of the 2017 election, Fine Gael had 73 members of its parliamentary party, 21,000 ordinary party members, and 235 councilors. Under the rules, leadership candidates must be members of the lower house and nominated by 10% of their parliamentary peers.163 Two candidates competed: Leo Varadkar and Simon Coveney. Although Coveney won the party membership vote by a margin of two to one, Varadkar won the election overall 60% to 40% after gaining the votes of 70% of the parliamentary party.164 Accordingly, the votes of fifty-one parliamentarians easily outweighed those of 7000 party members.

As mentioned above, New Zealand’s Labour Party provides another example of weighted voting that retains a strong component

160 Id.
162 Id. at § 49(c).
163 See id. at § 49(e).
of judgment by parliamentary peers. Since 2012, the Labour Party’s selection process involves a closed primary in which the vote is divided between the parliamentary caucus, party members, and party affiliates (unions), although in this case in a 40/40/20% split. Likewise, Kevin Rudd’s reform of the Labor Party rules in 2013 created a mixed system with weighted voting in which nominees must first receive the support of 20% of party MPs, and then both party members and MPs vote separately, with the two pools each counting for 50%.

D. Neither Peer Review Nor Populist Systems

Certain other countries, while largely dispensing with peer review in recent years, have nonetheless retained a relatively narrow selectorate by empowering ordinary members of the party, but not the mass of its voters, to choose its candidate. Two important examples are Canada and Israel.

1. Canada

Although Canada now has three main national parties—the Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democratic Party (NDP)—only the first two have governed and so had their leader serve as Prime Minister. As in most countries, there are no laws governing party leadership contests, although as of 2004 there is public regulation of some aspects of financing campaigns.

Until the early part of the twentieth century, party leaders were selected exclusively by parliamentarians. Progressive-era reforms began to open up the process—first within the Liberal Party and then the others—to extra-parliamentary actors and organizations in the form of leadership conventions at which delegates formed the selectorate. During the 1960s and 1970s, the role of rank-and-file members at these conventions increased relative to that of party elites, through increasing the numbers of delegates chosen to represent local party members.

Following the lead of the provincial Bloc

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165 In its first use in October 2013, current party leader Bill Shorten won against Anthony Albanese with the support of 64% of the party’s 86 MPs (55) and 40% of its 30,426 voting members, winning 52% to 48% overall but with 12,196 total votes to the loser’s 18,230. See, e.g., Simon Benson, Bill Shorten Elected ALP Leader Over Anthony Albanese in Tight Contest, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/bill-shorten-elected-alp-leader-over-anthony-albanese-in-tight-contest/news-story/787d24aced4837bexc4e9e48404c13650.

166 See, e.g., William P. Cross, Party Leadership in Canada, in SELECTION OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, supra note 96, at 171, 172 (discussing the lack of laws governing party leadership contests); id. at 182–83 (discussing the 2004 reforms).

167 See id. at 173.

168 See id. at 174.
Québécois in 1997, and in response to abuse and criticism of the delegate selection processes, the national parties began to switch to direct, full membership votes beginning with the Conservatives in 1998, followed by the New Democrats in 2012, and the Liberal Party in 2011.169 In the case of the Conservatives and Liberals, one member, one vote is diluted by traditional concerns for equal representation of Canada’s regions and provinces, so that each district (riding) has the same number of votes (points) in the contest regardless of number of members.170

On the one hand, as part of the move towards more inclusive selection methods, the major Canadian parties have largely dispensed with forms of peer review. Thus, the parliamentary parties no longer have an official gatekeeping or other privileged role in the leadership selection process: There is no preliminary filtering of candidates, no threshold support requirement, and no weighted vote as under the systems considered in the previous subsection.171 The only requirements for candidacy are payment of an entrance fee ranging from $30,000 (NDP) to $75,000 (Liberals) and, in the case of the Conservatives and NDP, the signatures of a specified number of party members.172 In addition, candidates are subject to strict spending limits.173

On the other hand, despite the greater inclusivity, the selectorate remains relatively narrow and a very small percentage of the total electorate. In the case of the Conservatives and the NDP, this selectorate is limited to party members.174 In their respective 2017 leadership elections, 141,000 Conservative and 65,782 NDP members cast votes out of a total electorate of twenty-five million.175 In its only post-delegate-system leadership election so far, in 2013, the Liberals

169 See id. at 175–76.
170 See id. at 179–80.
171 See id. at 176–78.
173 See Cross, supra note 166, at 183 (noting that newly enacted federal campaign laws limiting contributions have made fundraising more difficult for Canadian candidates). The limits were $950,000 in the Liberal contest of 2013 and $5,000,000 and $1,500,000 in the Conservative and NDP contests of 2017, respectively. Jason Fekete, Candidates’ $5M Spending Cap in Conservative Leadership Race Draws Mixed Response, Nat’l. Post (Mar. 9, 2016), http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/candidates-5m-spending-cap-in-conservative-leadership-race-draws-mixed-response.
174 See Cross, supra note 166, at 175–76.
permitted party “supporters,” defined as those who certify that they support the party’s goals and belong to no other party but who do not wish to become a member, to register as voters in addition to party members.176 Formally, perhaps, this transforms the selection method from a closed to a “semi-open” primary,177 along the lines of those in Italy and France to be discussed in the next section, but the actual numbers involved were significantly lower. The total number of votes cast in the election was 104,000.178 Since the change to full membership votes, party leadership contests have typically been highly competitive with an average of five candidates, resulted in the creation of campaign organizations, and tended to last far longer than general election campaigns, often running to ten months or more.179

2. Israel

Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which there have always been coalition governments.180 Party leaders are the parties’ candidates for Prime Minister in the case of the three larger parties, and for senior ministerial office in the coalition government in the case of the smaller parties. Indeed, half of Israel’s Prime Ministers assumed office after becoming party leader but without a general election.181 Only three political parties have led coalition governments in Israel’s history and so are considered the major or governing parties: the long-standing Labour and Likud Parties, which trace their direct roots to pre-statehood political organizations, and the short-lived Kadima, established in 2005 when Ariel Sharon broke from Likud but which was effectively disbanded in 2015.182 Until 1977, Labour was the clearly dominant party but since then, Likud has been in power as the leader of coalition governments more often so that the party system can be referred to as “bipolar.”183

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179 See Cross, supra note 166, at 182–84.
180 Ofer Kenig & Gideon Rahat, Selecting Party Leaders in Israel, in Selection of Political Party Leaders, supra note 96, at 206.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 206–07.
183 Id. at 206–07, 214.
Over the period of Israel’s history, Labour and Likud have gone through similar gradual processes of opening up their leadership selection processes, with the current situation being that all three major parties have virtually identical systems of closed primaries.\textsuperscript{184} Until David Ben-Gurion’s retirement in 1963, he was essentially the unchallenged “natural leader” of Mapai, which merged into the modern Labour Party in 1968, and there were no formal leadership rules.\textsuperscript{185} Between 1963 and 1974, his successors, first Levi Eshkol and then Golda Meir, were appointed after informal consultations among the party’s elite “old guard,” and ratification by the party’s central committee.\textsuperscript{186} Following widespread opposition and Meir’s forced resignation after the near-disaster of the Yom Kippur War, the party formalized selection rules for the first time by instigating an open leadership contest in 1974 for the votes of the 600 members of the party’s central committee.\textsuperscript{187} In 1977, this was broadened on an ad hoc basis to include the 3000 delegates to the party’s convention.\textsuperscript{188} Finally, in 1992, after the party’s general election defeat in 1988 under Shimon Peres, an internal party campaign for democratization and revitalization largely on the part of supporters of his rival Yitzhak Rabin, who (in the reverse of Peres) had greater support in the broader party than in the party organization, led to the first direct election of the leader by the party’s 150,000 or so members.\textsuperscript{189} This was also the first multi-candidate contest.\textsuperscript{190} The closed primary selection process has in essence remained the same ever since, with some minor tinkering with the rules each election cycle.\textsuperscript{191} In 2012, all party members of at least six months standing were eligible to vote.\textsuperscript{192} Candidates were required to have a similar minimum period of party membership, obtain signatures of 500 supportive party members, and pay a registration fee of NIS 10,000 (around $2500).\textsuperscript{193} To win, a candidate had to receive at least 40% of the vote in the first round or a majority in the run-off of the top two.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{184} See id. at 214.
\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 206, 209.
\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 209.
\textsuperscript{187} Id.
\textsuperscript{188} Id.
\textsuperscript{189} Id. at 209–10.
\textsuperscript{190} See id. at 210.
\textsuperscript{191} See id.
\textsuperscript{192} See id.
\textsuperscript{193} Id. at 212. See Bram Wauters, Gideon Rahat & Ofer Kenig, Democratising Party Leadership Selection in Belgium and Israel, in Party Primaries in Comparative Perspective, supra note 148, at 85, 92–93 tbl.5.1.
\textsuperscript{194} Kenig & Rahat, supra note 180, at 210.
Likud followed a similar path to a more inclusive process. Menachim Begin was the unchallenged head of the party until his resignation as Prime Minister and leader in 1983. Yitzhak Shamir replaced him as leader in a two-man contest decided by the party’s central committee. After electoral defeat in 1992, the party sought to renew its image and opted to copy Labour’s new closed primary system for its perceived potential electoral advantage. The only difference between the Likud and Labour processes now is that Likud candidates have to be party members for at least three years, instead of only six months.

In 2008, three years after its creation by self-acclaimed leader Ariel Sharon, the now-defunct Kadima followed suit and adopted the same leadership selection rules as Labour and Likud, although the requirement of thirteen months party membership to vote and run was suspended to allow new members to participate. The current third largest party, Yesh Atid (There is a Future), was founded by former journalist Yair Lapid in 2012, who remains its (unelected) leader.

Since the two traditional major parties shifted to an unweighted closed primary system in 1992, state regulation of leadership contests began and has increased, primarily through the “Party Law,” which imposes fairly strict limits for donations to candidates and on expenditures in proportion to the size of the electorate. Although there are no fixed terms, leadership selection contests usually take place several months before the general election. The shift to selection by all party members has resulted in both a larger average number of candidates and a slightly higher margin of victory compared to the more exclusive previous processes, as well as massive new party membership drives at selection time largely organized by the candidates’ organizations.

195 See id. at 210–14.
196 See id. at 210–11.
197 See id. at 211.
198 See id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 211–12.
202 Kenig & Rahat, supra note 180, at 216.
203 Wauters, Rahat & Kenig, supra note 193, at 91.
204 See Kenig & Rahat, supra note 180, at 216–18.
E. Mostly Populist Systems

Finally, we turn to examples of countries that now employ a predominantly populist method of selection for at least one of the two major parties. As far as we are aware, the first mostly populist, open primary selection process in an established democracy outside the United States did not occur until 2005 in Italy.\(^{205}\) In subsequent years, a few others have followed suit.

1. Italy

The history of the Italian parliamentary system is commonly divided between the First Republic, which lasted from 1946 until 1993, and the Second Republic, since 1993.\(^{206}\) The First Republic was characterized by proportional representation (PR), a classic multiparty system; bureaucratized and mass political parties with leaders selected by party congresses of one to 3000 delegates; and chronic government instability but little electoral alternation in office (i.e., a perennial reshuffling of executive positions among the same group of political leaders).\(^{207}\) The Second Republic, ushered in by a switch to a more majoritarian electoral system in which 75% of seats were allocated by plurality voting in single-member constituencies and only 25% by PR,\(^{208}\) has been characterized by the emergence of two clear party blocs since 1996; pre-election coalitions among the multiple, often changing parties that comprise them (what has been termed “fragmented bipolarism”);\(^{209}\) and a far higher level of political party alternation in power following elections.\(^{210}\)

Since 2005, the two major party blocs have employed dramatically different approaches towards selection of both leaders and candidates for chief executive.\(^{211}\) Center-left parties have embraced the most highly inclusive process of the open primary, whereas the right-

\(^{205}\) In 1995, during the country’s period of democratization, the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party held an open primary for its candidate in the first direct presidential election, although it reverted to closed primaries of party members for subsequent ones. See Cross et al., supra note 177, at 30 (discussing Taiwan’s use of open primaries).

\(^{206}\) Giulia Sandri et al., The Selection of Party Leaders in Italy, 1989–2012, in Selection of Political Party Leaders, supra note 96, at 93.

\(^{207}\) Id. at 93, 97, 103.


\(^{209}\) See D’Alimonte, supra note 208, at 261.

\(^{210}\) See Sandri et al., supra note 206, at 93–94.

\(^{211}\) See id. at 94.
of-center parties have mostly adhered to more traditional and exclusive processes.\footnote{212}{See id.}

In 2005, the six parties forming the center-left “Olive Tree Coalition”\footnote{213}{See Salvatore Vassallo & Gianluca Passarelli, Centre-Left Prime Ministerial Primaries in Italy: The Laboratory of the ‘Open Party’ Model, 8 CONTEMP. ITALIAN POL. 12, 14–16 (2016) (documenting the formation of the Olive Tree Coalition).} held the first such open primary in Western Europe to select its joint candidate for Prime Minister in the following year’s general election.\footnote{214}{See Marino De Luca & Fulvio Venturino, Democratising Candidate Selection in Italy and France, in PARTY PRIMARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 148, at 129, 130, 134–35.} Candidates had to collect 10,000 voter signatures.\footnote{215}{See id. at 136.} Eligibility to vote was extended beyond the general election franchise to include seventeen-year-olds and resident foreigners, together with a requirement of endorsing the coalition manifesto and paying a one-euro fee at the polling station on Election Day.\footnote{216}{Id. at 134.} Coalition leaders hoped for a turnout of one million voters, but the actual figure was close to 4.3 million.\footnote{217}{Id. at 239.} Seven contested the election and the favorite, Romano Prodi, easily won with 74% of votes cast.\footnote{218}{Id. at 138.}

Not used in 2008, the open primary was revived in 2012 by the center-left coalition, then comprising (1) the Democratic Party (PD), formed in 2007 by a merger of several center-left parties and left-leaning Christian Democrats,\footnote{219}{See Vassallo & Passarelli, supra note 213, at 16–18 (describing the merger and party composition of the newly-formed Italian PD following the 2006 general election).} together with (2) the Left Ecology Freedom (SEL) Party and (3) the Democratic Centre (CD).\footnote{220}{See De Luca & Venturino, supra note 214, at 135.} The Democratic Party charter states that open primaries are to be the standard process for selection of all party candidates for representative roles.\footnote{221}{Id. at 131.} It also contains a rule that only the party leader can run as its candidate in the primary, a significant barrier to an outsider candidate—although the then-party leader, Pier Luigi Bersani, waived the rule in the face of a popular grassroots campaign for party reform led by challenger and then-mayor of Florence, Matteo Renzi.\footnote{222}{Id. at 134, 136.} For the 2012 prime ministerial primary, the center-left bloc employed a two-round system with a potential run-off rather than the plurality vote system of 2005.\footnote{223}{Id. at 138.} Twenty thousand voter signatures were needed to run, and this time pre-registration and a two-euro payment were
required to vote with a minimum voting age of eighteen.\textsuperscript{224} Three million voted in the first round contested by five candidates, in which Bersani came first with 45\% of the vote and Renzi second with 35\%.\textsuperscript{225} Bersani then won the run-off 60\% to 40\%.\textsuperscript{226}

In terms of party leadership selection, the Democratic Party has used open primaries for its only four contests thus far: in 2007 (won by Walter Veltoni), 2009 (Pier Luigi Bersani), 2013 (Matteo Renzi), and 2017 (Matteo Renzi).\textsuperscript{227} Renzi became the third “unelected” Prime Minister in a row in February 2014 when, as party leader, he instigated and won a Democratic Party vote calling on party co-founder Enrico Letta to resign as incumbent prime minster at the head of a grand coalition government of centre-left and centre-right parties.\textsuperscript{228}

By sharp contrast, the highly personalized right-of-center parties of Silvio Berlusconi\textsuperscript{229} and Umberto Bossi\textsuperscript{230} continued their norm of uncontested leadership coronations via party congresses and appointment as coalition candidate, although on Bossi’s resignation in 2012, the Northern League held its first closed primary leadership election, followed by a second one a year later.\textsuperscript{231} To select its prime ministerial candidate for the March 2018 general election, the “anti-establishment” and opinion poll-leading Five Star Movement held an online primary among its 150,000 members, in which its most prominent and popular politician, thirty-one year old Luigi Di Maio, easily defeated seven largely unknown opponents.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{224} Id. at 134.
\textsuperscript{225} Id. at 138.
\textsuperscript{226} Id.
\textsuperscript{231} Sandri et al., supra note 206, at 132.
2. France

France has had a semi-presidential system of government under its Fifth Republic since 1958, and a directly elected President since 1962. It employs a two-round majoritarian voting system for both presidential and legislative general elections and, until last year, had a fairly stable two-party/bloc system of left-of-centre Socialists and right-of-centre Gaullists, currently called The Republicans. In 2017 for the first time, neither party’s candidate made it to the presidential run-off and the victor’s brand new La République En Marche! party then won a landslide legislative majority in the lower house two months later. The future of the two traditional major parties remains highly uncertain.

Until 1995, both major parties selected their leaders and presidential candidates by councils or congresses of party elites. Since then, the Parti Socialiste (PS) has twice selected its presidential candidate by closed primary of all party members (in 1995 and 2006) and twice by open primary, in 2011 and 2017. The Gaullist/right-of-centre party held an open primary for the first time in 2017. The reasons for the switch first from traditional selection by the party elite (the 200 or so members of the PS National Council), then to the broader party membership, and finally to an open primary appear to include the full standard range: a resolution of an internal party quarrel (1995), a response to electoral disaster after reverting to the party elite for the 2002 election (2006), a perception that being chosen by voters rather than party members makes a candidate more electable (2011), as well as emulation of the Italian example (2011).

As François Mitterand’s two terms in office were coming to an end in 1995, and following the decisions of its two preferred candidates (Jacques Delors and former Prime Minister Michel Rocard) not to run, the PS National Council determined to let the party membership resolve the disagreements among its various factions. Only two persons responded to its call for nominations: first Lionel Jospin and then party leader Henri Emmanuelli. Jospin easily won with 65.8% of the 82,000 party member votes cast in the first round, although he

233 See De Luca & Venturino, supra note 214, at 129.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 130. The 2011 open primary technically chose the presidential candidate of the left coalition, including the smaller Radical Party, rather than the PS alone. See id.
236 Id. at 132–34. These episodes are detailed in the material that follows.
237 Id. at 132.
lost the general election to Gaullist candidate Jacques Chirac.\textsuperscript{239} In 2002, the National Council saw no need to hold a primary as Jospin, the PS Prime Minister in a “cohabitation” government with Chirac, appeared to be the only plausible candidate.\textsuperscript{240} The ensuing general election was a disaster and a great shock to the PS, and the country as a whole, as Jospin did not survive the first round but was beaten for a place in the run-off against Chirac by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the extreme right National Front.\textsuperscript{241}

After the disaster of 2002, the National Council determined to hold a closed primary for the second time in 2006.\textsuperscript{242} Unlike in 1995, candidate qualifications were imposed, in the form of endorsement by thirty of the Council’s two hundred members.\textsuperscript{243} As a result, only three candidates—Segolene Royal, Laurent Fabius, and Dominic Strauss-Kahn—emerged with sufficient elite support, and several prominent PS figures were unable to run.\textsuperscript{244} Then-party leader François Hollande, partner of the front running Royal at the time, also initially appeared to have a good deal of support among the party elite, but withdrew.\textsuperscript{245} This first highly visible and much-covered presidential primary was the occasion for an intensive campaign to recruit new members, including a new low-cost party card, and succeeded in boosting membership from 120,000 to 220,000.\textsuperscript{246} Viewed as by far the most likely to challenge the Gaullist candidate Nicholas Sarkozy, Royal won on the first round, with 60% of the 180,000 votes.\textsuperscript{247} She lost the general election to Sarkozy 53% to 47% in the second round run-off.\textsuperscript{248}

Following three successive presidential election defeats, a party report on the potential benefits of an open primary in rendering the party’s presidential candidate more electable, highly influenced by the 2005 Italian example of Romano Prodi’s general election victory the


\textsuperscript{240} See De Luca & Venturino, supra note 214, at 132.

\textsuperscript{241} Id. at 132–33.

\textsuperscript{242} Id. at 134–35.

\textsuperscript{243} Id. at 134–35, 137.

\textsuperscript{244} Id. at 137.


\textsuperscript{246} De Luca & Venturino, supra note 214, at 136, 138.

\textsuperscript{247} See Sciolino, supra note 245.

\textsuperscript{248} France Looks to New Sarkozy Era, BBC (May 7, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6631813.stm.
following year, was approved by a vote of party members.\textsuperscript{249} Accordingly, the first open primary was held by the PS in 2011, and the success of its victor in the subsequent general election led not only to its repeat in 2016 and perhaps permanent status, but also its adoption by the other major party, The Republicans, for the first time. In 2011, the PS National Council rules required candidates to have at least 5% support among the parliamentary group, the National Council, regional councilors, or PS mayors in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{250} All citizens eighteen years or older at the time of the general election who subscribed to the “Charter of Values” of the left coalition and paid a one-euro fee were eligible to vote.\textsuperscript{251} Over 2,600,000 cast ballots in the inconclusive first round, and 200,000 more in the second round run-off between PS leader Martin Aubry and Hollande, which the latter won with 56.6% of the vote.\textsuperscript{252}

The main right-of-centre party, variously and successively named the Rally for the Republic (RPR) (1976–2002), the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) (2002–2005), and most recently, The Republicans (2015–present), selected its presidential candidate by means of a delegate vote at its party congress until 2007.\textsuperscript{253} In that year, following President Chirac’s decision not to seek a third term and the selection through closed primary of PS candidate Segolene Royal, the UMP decided to follow suit and hold a closed primary of its members for the first time.\textsuperscript{254} However, after it transpired that Nicholas Sarkozy was the only candidate, party members were asked to vote anyway, with 98% of those voting supporting him, and his nomination was formally announced at the party congress in January 2007.\textsuperscript{255} As sitting President, Sarkozy was again unopposed in 2012, so 2016 was in fact the first contested primary in the party’s history.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See De Luca & Venturino, \textit{supra} note 214, at 130.
\item \textit{Id.} at 137.
\item \textit{Id.} at 136.
\item \textit{Id.} at 138–39.
\item See \textit{id.} at 133. Edouard Balladur, the incumbent RPR prime minister at the time, ran against the official RPR candidate Jacques Chirac in the 1995 presidential general election. \textit{See}, e.g., Drozdiak, \textit{supra} note 238. He did so as an individual eligible to do so under the 1962 organic law on qualifications to be a candidate in presidential elections, which include gaining signatures from 500 elected officials, and as largely representing the position of the junior coalition partner party, the UDF. \textit{See} Howard Machin, \textit{The 1995 Presidential Election Campaigns, in Electing the French President: The 1995 Presidential Election} 26, 34 (Robert Elgie ed., 1996).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In February 2016, PS leader Jean-Christophe Cambadelis publicly indicated support for a party primary to select its presidential candidate in 2017, despite incumbent (but unpopular) PS President Hollande.\textsuperscript{256} In June, the party’s National Council unanimously voted to hold a primary in January 2017, the first time a sitting President had ever had to face one. A few weeks before the scheduled date, Hollande, with record low approval ratings, announced that he would not be a candidate.\textsuperscript{257} Candidates were required to secure the support of 5\% of one of the following groups: members of the National Council; PS MPs; regional and departmental PS councilors; or PS mayors representing more than 10,000 people, in at least four regions and ten departments.\textsuperscript{258} Seven qualified to contest the first round, four PS members and three from other center-left parties in electoral alliance with it. Benoît Hamon easily won the run-off against Manuel Valls with almost 60\% of the two million votes cast.\textsuperscript{259} The Republicans also held an open primary for the first time in November 2016. Candidates were required to gain the support of 20 party MPs, 2500 party members, and 250 other elected representatives to participate.\textsuperscript{260} Although former President Sarkozy fared a little better than his successor, he came third in the first round out of the seven candidates and so did not qualify for the run-off, in which Francois Fillon defeated Alain Juppé by a margin of two-to-one, with 4.3 million votes cast.\textsuperscript{261} Neither of the two finalists in the presidential general election, Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, faced selection contests,

\textsuperscript{256} See French Left Must Agree on a Candidate for Presidential Election: Hollande’s Party Chief, \textit{Reuters} (Feb. 18, 2016), https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN0VR1Q2.


3. \textit{Argentina}

Argentina is a multiparty presidential democracy, with two main political parties/alliances and many smaller ones. Historically, these have been the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the non-Peronist Radical Civic Union (UCR).\footnote{263}{See Jesper Tvevad, \textit{European Parliament, Argentina: A Change of Course} 1 (2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/570450/EXPO_BRI(2015)570450_EN.pdf.} In recent elections, the PJ has been divided into two separate alliances, with its left-wing factions the dominant partner in the Frente para la Victoria (FPV) alliance and its center-right factions forming the Federal or Dissident Peronist alliance. In 2015, the UCR alliance (“Cambiemos”) with a newer center-right party, Republican Proposal (PRO), was victorious in the presidential elections, thereby ending the twelve-year Kirchner/FPV regime (Nestor Kirchner, 2003–2007; Christina Fernandez de Kirchner, 2007–2015).\footnote{264}{Id.} For presidential general elections, Argentina has since 1994 employed a two-round majoritarian voting system, although a second-round run-off between the top two candidates was not needed until the 2015 election.\footnote{265}{Id.} For legislative elections, it has used a slightly different version of PR for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

In December 2009, the Kirchners sponsored and Congress (still with a FPV majority) enacted the “Law of Democratization of Political Representation, Transparency and Electoral Equity,”\footnote{266}{Law No. 26.571, Dec. 14, 2009, 31.800 B.O. 1.} which radically overhauled campaigns for presidential elections, as well as for most other public offices.\footnote{267}{Mark P. Jones, \textit{Argentina 2011}, Am. Q., http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1898 (last visited May 15, 2018).} In relevant part, the law, first used in the 2011 presidential campaign, (1) mandates all political parties to hold an open primary for their presidential candidate; (2) requires the primaries to be held simultaneously, eleven weeks before the first round of the general election in October, and subjects them to the same compulsory voting rule for all citizens ages eighteen to sixty-nine applying to general elections (voters may choose in which primary to cast their one vote); (3) requires parties to receive more than
1.5% of votes cast for all primary candidates for President in order to run a candidate in the general election; and (4) substantially reduces the role of private money in presidential campaigns by having all television and radio air time (the principal expenditure item in previous campaigns) distributed exclusively by the federal government, with one half divided equally among candidates and the other half allocated proportionally based on the percentage of the party’s vote in the previous chamber of deputies election.268

The law was in part a response to widespread calls for reform of the fragmented, party elite- and private money-dominated system of selecting candidates for public office, and in part a calculated act to improve the chances of reelection of one or other of the husband and wife Kirchner team in 2011 and perhaps also 2015.269 Knowing that a second-round run-off would likely unite the votes of the two anti-FPV alliances, victory in the election depended on keeping them split and winning in the first round, which requires either receiving 45% of the vote or 40% with a minimum 10% lead over the nearest rival. By reducing the number of candidates to a likely four to six as compared with the fourteen in 2007, the 1.5% threshold decreased fragmentation of the vote and made the 40% mark more attainable.270 Sure of the FPV nomination themselves, the two looser main opposition alliances were faced with the prospect of potentially divisive primaries that could lead to defections in the general election. The law also potentially kept the opposition alliances from knowing who their presidential candidate would be until two months before the general election, which might well have weakened their challenge.271 Finally, experience in 2007 had shown that the Kirchner’s media advantage flowing from controlling the government and state apparatuses could be negated by wealthy individuals.272

On August 14, 2011, citizens voted in the first open primary under the new law. Ten presidential “pre-candidates” were on the ballot, representing ten different parties or alliances. Accordingly, as each party or alliance had only one candidate, there were no intra-party contests.273 Effectively, each party or alliance bypassed the primary and selected its candidate according to its traditional, mostly more

268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
elitist method, so that as a primary election per se it was largely a farce. The closest thing to an intra-party contest was among the Federal/Dissident Peronist alliance, which had held a regional primary in Buenos Aires in April but with no clear winner, so that its two main pre-candidates—both also members of the PJ—eventually ran for separate Federal/Dissident Peronist parties (the Popular Front and the Federal Commitment) in both the national primary in August and the general election in October. As a result, three Peronists were running under separate party banners. Cristina Kirchner and the FPV won slightly over 50% of the vote, with the UCR candidate second at 12%.\footnote{Paula Cerutti et al., Argentina’s President, Cristina Kirchner, Wins Election Primary, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/08/15/argentina-president-cristina-kirchner-primary.} The primary did serve as a useful national public opinion poll shortly before the general election, with an 81% turnout, and also weeded out three of the candidates who failed to reach the threshold.\footnote{David Hodari, Argentina Elections 2015: A Guide to the Parties, Polls and Electoral System, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/23/argentina-elections-2015-a-guide-to-the-parties-polls-and-electoral-system (referencing Argentina’s voter turnout in 2011).} In October, Cristina Kirchner won on the first round with 54% of the vote.\footnote{Cristina Kirchner Re-Elected as Argentina’s President in Landslide, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/24/cristina-kirchner-win-argentina-elections.}

In 2015, Kirchner could not run again because the Argentinian Constitution contains a two-term limit, and her attempt to amend it to permit a third failed to attract the necessary support.\footnote{See, e.g., Argentina’s Fernandez Considers Scrapping Term Limits, STRATFOR: WORLDVIEW (Aug. 21, 2012), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/argentinas-fernandez-considers-scrapping-term-limits; Argentina’s Kirchner Suffers Election Blow, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 27, 2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/10/argentina-ruling-party-losses-ground-vote-2013102730264459.html.} Several prominent FPV politicians announced their pre-candidacies, but Kirchner subsequently asked all of them to withdraw in favor of Daniel Scioli, Vice President under her husband Nestor between 2003 and 2007 and then-Governor of Buenos Aires province, who was therefore the only FPV candidate on the primary ballot in August. Unlike in 2011, however, three other alliances had more than one candidate on the ballot, although only one of these intra-party contests was competitive.\footnote{The successful Workers’ Left Front candidate won by under 20,000 votes out of over 700,000 votes cast for the party. See, e.g., Todd Chretien, The Left Gains in Argentina’s Elections, SOCIALIST WORKER (Aug. 25, 2015), https://socialistworker.org/2015/08/25/the-left-gains-in-argentininas-elections.} But the other two did involve the main opposition alliances: “Cambiemos,” the center-right non-Peronist coalition of the RCU and
PRO, for which Mauricio Macri easily won selection with over 81% of the nearly 6.8 million votes cast for the alliance; and “United for a New Alternative” (UNA), the center-right Federal/Dissident Peronist coalition, for which Sergio Massa defeated Jose Manuel de la Sota by 70-to-30% of the party’s vote. Although the primary reduced the field from fifteen to six candidates, the general election proved the Kirchner’s concerns correct. Scioli won the first round but with only 37% of the vote to Cambiemos’s 33% and UNA’s 21.3%, and then lost to Macri in the first-ever run-off 51% to 49%, thus ending the Kirchner regime.

4. South Korea

Under its current Sixth Republic and 1987 Constitution, South Korea is a presidential democracy with two main but weakly institutionalized political parties and several smaller ones. Currently, these two parties are the center-right Liberty Korea Party, founded in 1997, which held the presidency until Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in March 2017, and the center-left Democratic or Minjoo Party of Korea, which currently holds a majority in the legislature and won the presidential election to fill the vacancy. In this election, the candidate of the centrist People’s Party, founded in 2016, was also a serious contender; at one point, opinion polls showed him closing quickly on the eventual winner, Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party.

Prior to 2002, party candidates for President in both main parties were selected at the party convention by delegates from the various electoral districts. Under this system, party leaders wielded great influence, both in the selection of delegates and the choice of nom-


281 Formerly known as the Grand National Party and then the Saenuri (literally “New Frontier”) Party.


284 See id.
In 2002, both the then-ruling Millenium Democratic Party (MDP), a predecessor of the Democratic Party, and the Grand National Party (GNP), the proto-Liberty Korea Party, decided to hold primaries for the first time. The MDP decision came a bit earlier, in the first months of 2002, when the incumbent MDP President of Korea, Kim Dae-jung, unable to run again due to the constitution’s one-term limit, agreed to primaries after the different factions of the party could not reach consensus on a candidate. The party had also suffered a sharp decline in popularity, due to allegations of corruption surrounding the President’s sons and close advisors, so that holding a primary was perceived as the best way to transform its public image. Supporters of the eventual winner, the “outsider” Roh Moo-hyun, also pushed for a primary, knowing it was the only way he could win.

Primary elections were held from March to April 2002 in sixteen different cities and provinces. A distinctive feature was their hybrid nature as a mixture of peer review as well as closed and partially open primaries: 20% of the vote was allocated to the party’s precinct level delegates, 30% to randomly selected party members from the local district party members pool, and 50% to randomly selected voters from those who submitted applications to participate in the primary. In a fairly clear example of a “contagion effect,” the GNP then felt bound to follow suit, although their similarly organized primary was not competitive.

In the 2012 presidential election, the Democratic Party’s immediate predecessor (the Democratic United Party or DUP) held the first fully open primary, which also featured “mobile voting” via electronic devices. Six hundred and fourteen thousand voters out of a total of forty million registered voters participated in the four-candi-

286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 32.
289 Id. at 44 (discussing how Roh Moo-hyun’s lack of party support was an obstacle to his winning the presidential election).
290 Id. at 32.
291 Id.
292 Id.
date contest. By contrast, the (renamed) Saenuri Party (the intermediate stage between the GNP and Liberty Korea Party) adhered to the existing hybrid model. The result was a similarly uncompetitive race as in 2002, with Park Geun-hye winning with 84% of the 103,000 votes cast, although in 2007 Park had narrowly lost a very close primary to Lee Myung-bak, who went on to win the presidency in December.

In the recent, somewhat hastily organized presidential election that was moved up by seven months due to Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in March, the three main parties adopted candidate selection systems that involved different degrees of peer review. The (successful) Democratic Party held a series of four open primaries in which four candidates ran and 1.64 million people voted—compared to approximately twenty-nine million votes cast in the general election. In the centrist People’s Party, the party’s executive officers, members of the National Assembly, and regional chairs acted first as gatekeepers by voting to reduce the field of registered candidates from six to three, ousted the least known and experienced. After this peer-review filtering had taken place, the party then held an open primary that counted for 80% of the result, with the other 20% based on random opinion polls of voters. Finally, the Liberty Korea Party selected its candidate by a weighted system of 50% based on votes cast by delegates at the party convention and 50% based on spot opinion polling of non-members.

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As the French, Argentinian, and Korean (and to a lesser extent the Italian) experiences show, even systems that we call “mostly populist” because they rely on open primaries, often still build in important mechanisms of peer review that distinguish these systems from the

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294 See id. (reporting this electoral turnout); Republic of Korea, ElectionGuide, Int’l Found. for Electoral Sys. (2018), http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/114/ (noting that South Korea has approximately forty million registered voters).


298 Id.
American one. The French require a certain level of support among the party’s senior or elected officials. In South Korea, the Korean People’s Party employed pre-screening by the party’s organizational apparatus in 2017 to reduce the number of candidates and select the best qualified and most competent. These are both examples of peer-review filtering that determines who can get on the ballot that the populist party electorate then gets to vote on in the open primary.

These open primaries also differ from the system in the United States in another important respect: The “open primaries” of other systems typically involve far fewer voters, relative to the general electorate, than in the United States. For example, in France a total of 6.3 million voters cast ballots in the PS and Republican primaries combined in 2016 and 2017, while thirty-six million people voted in the general election (i.e., around 16%). Similarly, in South Korea, 1.64 million participated in the Democratic Party primaries out of thirteen million who voted for it in the general election. In the United States, approximately sixty million voters participated in Republican and Democratic primaries combined, and one hundred and thirty million in the general election (i.e., around 45%). Accordingly, despite the “openness” of these primaries, it cannot really be said, as it can of the United States, that the selection process has been turned over to the mass of ordinary voters.

F. Why the Recent Trend Towards Somewhat Greater Inclusivity?

As we have seen, over the past decade or so there has been a general trend towards more inclusive methods for selecting party candidates for chief executive. Depending mostly on whether a country has a parliamentary or presidential system of government, this has involved opening up to broader selectorates than previously either contests for the position of party leader or party candidate for the public office of chief executive. These more inclusive selection

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methods than the traditional choice by party elites—usually the party’s legislative caucus (or parliamentary party) or delegates to the party convention—are, from less to more inclusive: (1) closed primaries with a system of weighted voting among the party’s various constituencies, (2) closed primaries with a system of equal voting among party members (one member, one vote), and (3) open primaries.

Notwithstanding this clear trend, three points emerge from the previous analysis, by comparison with the populist selection method in the United States. First, this trend is not universal. Several major democracies, including India, Germany, South Africa, Brazil, and Australia, have thus far resisted it more or less entirely and retained selection methods that rely almost exclusively on peer review.\(^{303}\) Second, the general trend towards greater popular control has not always or everywhere resulted in complete popular control, but has been quite varied in terms of the extent and forms of peer review that remain. Third, as just noted, the U.S. primary system has the broadest selectorate of any major democracy by far, and so is the most truly populist.\(^{304}\) The ability of a party to control or influence outcomes is diminished as the size of the selectorate expands.

A variety of reasons help to explain the trend, but the main driving force seems to have been the strategic political calculations of party elites rather than any large-scale pressure for change from the grassroots membership. Although the trend predates the populist surge of the past few years, and even though disillusionment with the mainstream parties has undoubtedly been fueling it, most of this alienation appears to reflect more substantive, policy-based concerns—economic decline and inequality, immigration, national identity, social change, etc.—than procedural or voice-based ones, although of course the two are not hermetically sealed.\(^{305}\) Also, although other countries’ reasons are not wholly dissimilar to those that explain the shift to populist selection methods in the United States, imitating or copying the United States is generally not one of them.

Most obviously and commonly, the expansion of selectorates has been an almost reflexive response to massive electoral defeat and, in this context, viewed as a way to quickly refresh and revitalize the party’s popular image. As we saw, this was the case for both the United Kingdom’s Conservatives in 1965 and 1998 and Labour in 1981...

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303 See supra Section II.B.
304 See supra Part I.
and 1993, the PS in France after the catastrophe of 2002, and the LDP in Japan in 1977 following its first ever failure to secure a majority in the lower house.\footnote{See supra Sections II.C & II.E.} In South Korea, the step was taken preemptively following a sharp loss of popularity of the ruling MDP before the 2002 election.\footnote{See supra Sections II.B & II.E.}

A more structural reason is that “intra-party democracy” responds to—although at the same time it also further enhances—the growing personalization (in parliamentary systems, the “presidentialization”) of politics, in which the focus is increasingly on individuals and personality rather than parties and policies as part of the more general sound-bite, Twitter, celebrity culture we live in.\footnote{See, e.g., THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 101, at 7–11.} Decline in political party membership has been a near-universal symptom of this process, as well as of more recent populist-specific alienation, so parties have sought to give rank-and-file members a voice and thereby an incentive to join the party by implementing closed primaries in an attempt to counteract this trend. Some expansions of the selectorate have resulted from party elite conflict, with an appeal to the broader membership as the way to break factional deadlock (PS in 1995, South Korean MDP in 2002), and others from strategic partisanship on the part of supporters of a candidate facing an opponent who is a party organization insider. Examples here are Yitzhak Rabin versus Shimon Peres in Israel, Ed Miliband in the United Kingdom, and Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea. Finally, intra-party democracy within major (but generally not minor) parties has a contagion effect. With the exceptions of Italy, Australia, and New Zealand, it has appeared too politically costly for the second party not to shift in the same direction as the first mover. Most frequently, though not universally, the instigator has been the left-of-center party, followed sooner or later by the right-of-center.

\subsection*{G. Other Contextual Factors Resulting in Greater Party Control Outside the United States}

The existence and extent of peer review and party control versus populism in candidate selection for chief executive is not only a function of the specific rules and selectorates employed, but also of other, more general features of the political system within which the selection takes place. Many of these features are ones in which the United States is also relatively exceptional, so they provide an additional explanatory layer for what makes the United States such an extreme
version of a populist selection system in which peer review plays, at most, a limited and indirect role.

The first is the near-unique absence in the United States of a distinction (or very much of one) between being a party member and a party voter. For most ordinary citizens, at least, to be a party “member” is to be a “registered voter” for the party. According to the much looser and more generic requirements of party affiliation in the United States mean that, from a comparative standpoint, even formally “closed” primaries involve much larger electorates than elsewhere. By the standards of other countries, such primaries are already quasi-open. (Open primaries in the countries surveyed above typically require voters to affirm sympathy with their platform and sometimes pay a small fee, which is perhaps as onerous as registering to vote as a Republican or Democrat in the United States.) In other words, because the number of party members in other countries is almost always far smaller than the number of its voters, closed primaries outside the United States can be seen as exercises in “intra-party democracy” without also thereby becoming “populist.” For example, those eligible to vote in each of the Labour and Conservative leadership elections in the United Kingdom (i.e., party members) are less than 1% of all registered voters; a far higher percentage of registered voters are eligible to vote in U.S. primaries. The prospects for greater party control and formal or informal peer review are likely to be inversely related to the size of the selectorate.

Second, whether by law or practice, most public and private funding for primary (and general) elections outside the United States is channeled through party organizations and, given money’s growing importance everywhere, this inevitably enhances party control of the process. By comparison, the vast majority of funds are raised and effectively controlled by individual campaigns in the United States, which adds significantly to the loss of party control and the prospects of a “hostile takeover,” whether by populist or other forces.

Third, in a reversal of regulatory roles, U.S. primaries are “public elections,” organized and paid for by the state, and their rules are significantly (albeit variably) fashioned and regulated by state and federal law. By contrast, selection processes elsewhere are typically

309 If there ever were “card-carrying members” of political parties (other than perhaps the Communists), the modern primary system in the United States has helped to ensure those days are long gone.
310 See supra Section II.E.
deemed exclusively “private” matters and their rules set by the party itself—either in its constitution or by its national executive committee (or equivalent).\footnote{See examples throughout supra Sections II.B–II.E.} Here, as elsewhere, who controls the rules is, ceteris paribus, likely to have some influence on outcomes. Overwhelmingly, party elites have endorsed and instigated the various shifts towards intra-party democracy themselves, in contexts where and when they are perceived as serving the interests of the party or some section of it, rather than being forced to accept such changes as demanded by outside pressure, law, or grassroots memberships.

Fourth, the decentralized nature of political parties in the United States is in contrast with the typically more centralized national political parties elsewhere, even in robust federal systems. Clearly, the structure of both primary and general elections for president as conducted state by state rather than nationally in the United States is an important independent variable here; nonetheless, it does not entirely explain or compel such party decentralization. Where a party is essentially a “they,” not an “it,” it makes it more difficult to assert control by the party.

Fifth, the near-unique absence of the office of party leader in the United States also contributes to a relative lack of control. The point here is not the absence of a “Kirchner” to handpick their party’s candidate or that by being the presumptive candidate an incumbent party leader manifests party control (in presidential primaries, the French examples show there is not much presumption). It is rather that during the extraordinarily long U.S. primary season, there is almost no ongoing, continuous party leadership, identity, or collective policy platform; rather, each of the candidates offers an alternative individual version to the voters—their consumers—who will make the choice.

Sixth, in most countries, there is a fairly well understood track, in terms of qualifications and experience, towards becoming a major party’s candidate for chief executive. This may include educational background, working in and for the political party in various (junior, then more senior) capacities, or time spent as an elected representative or official. France of course is an extreme version of this phenomenon: Even Macron, the ultimate “outsider” candidate without a political party, is a graduate of Sciences Po and ENA, was a fast-track civil servant, and then a senior member of President Hollande’s staff before being appointed a minister. Most other countries have a somewhat more varied, flexible, or diverse track, but candidates are generally “insiders,” and often party insiders, of one sort or another.
inevitably creates a form of informal peer review and party control—as well as perhaps a marker of competence—as to who becomes its candidate for chief executive. By contrast, the general anti-government, anti-insider political culture of the United States militates against this, either by permitting or encouraging genuine outsiders to run for office—often with little or no political experience—or by requiring insiders to adopt the guise, demeanor, and political rhetoric of the outsider. In both cases, the language par excellence for this is “populism.” Being perceived as the product of peer review and party control can be fatal.

In a sense, the proof of the pudding for all of these comparative differences combined is the fact that outside the United States, populist leaders riding the current wave have tended to form their own political parties rather than attempt to capture an existing, mainstream one. Well-known examples include the National Front in France, the Five Star Movement in Italy, UKIP in the United Kingdom, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, the Freedom Party in Austria, the Alternative for Germany party, and the (currently governing) Law and Justice party in Poland.313 There is no doubt that a PR voting system is partly responsible for this strategy, as its emphasis on representation rewards rather than penalizes smaller parties, as long as there is no threshold or the smaller parties are confident of meeting it. On the other hand, the National Front has had some success within a majoritarian/two-party system.314 But a key part of the story is also that a major political party with greater peer review and party control of candidate selection is more difficult to capture and take over than one without; it becomes “populist-resistant.” It is not only hard to imagine Marine Le Pen emulating Donald Trump and becoming the Gaullist party presidential candidate or Nigel Farage the Conservative leader; it is also very hard to pull off.

This raises a fundamental issue of whether effectively channeling populists toward forming their own parties (as peer review helps to

313 Law and Justice, or abbreviated in Polish to PiS, was founded in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins and largely operates as the near-personal organization of the surviving one, who holds all the power as undisputed leader behind the scenes, choosing who the party’s “front men” as prime ministerial and presidential candidates will be. Jarosław Kaczyński was reelected as party leader in 2016, a post he has held since 2003, by the votes of 1008 of 1015 party delegates. See generally, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding (Sydney Law Sch. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103491.

314 The broader, leave/remain “Brexit” referendum aside, UKIP’s only real electoral success as a political party came in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, in which (unusually for the United Kingdom) PR is employed.
do) rather than incentivizing them to try and capture a major party (as in the United States) is a better containment strategy, to the extent this is deemed part of the appropriate response to some or all forms of populism. We believe that it is. For the latter is likely to be the easier route to power and preventing illiberal, authoritarian populists of the right and left from gaining power is currently the most urgent task, even if there are, of course, no guarantees of success,315 and the process of capture involves some dilution and accommodation of populist policies. Better a purer but minority populist party than a populist leader in power.316 Along with a PR voting rule to make it harder for such a party to convert an electoral minority into a legislative majority,317 a mixed system involving some form of peer review that creates a significant barrier to populists gaining power through capturing a major party is, and can be, only part of the “solution” to populism, given that disillusionment with traditional, more centrist parties and their ability to represent ordinary voters is one of the causes of the populist surge worldwide.318 But it is, we think, an important part. Other parts of the solution must address these underlying causes directly, especially more responsive social and economic policies on the part of non-populist parties,319 insofar as they are consistent with constitutional democracy.320 Even if the rise and election of populist

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315 Because for example, the distinct populist party manages to win power itself, as in Poland and Venezuela. Although not originally formed as a specifically populist party, Fidesz in Hungary has effectively become a personal platform for its co-founder and uncontested leader since 1993, Viktor Orban, and has transformed the country it governs into a model “illiberal democracy” since winning a supermajority of legislative seats in 2010. Another possibility, as recently actualized in Italy, is that two separate populist parties gain power together by forming a coalition government.

316 Where a distinct populist party does manage to win power itself, its “undiluted” policies will likely be more dangerous and harmful than where it captures a mainstream party. Ultimately our argument here turns on the judgment that the greater likelihood of success through capture outweighs the greater, but less likely, harm resulting from populist parties gaining power themselves.

317 This happened in Hungary, where Fidesz won supermajorities of 66% of the seats with 52.73% and 44.87% of the vote in 2010 and 2014, respectively, under a mixed PR/majoritarian voting system. Similarly, under the PR system in Poland in 2015, PiS won a majority of legislative seats with 38% of the vote, due to the fact that 15% of the electorate voted for smaller, left-of-center parties that did not satisfy the 5% threshold for representation. See Sadurski, supra note 313, at 60. Thus, 15% of the votes were wasted in the sense of not going to a party that held any seats in the legislature. Again, the recent Italian example of two separate and previously antagonistic populist parties forming a post-election coalition, supra note 315, shows that even a pure PR system is by no means guaranteed to prevent populists from gaining power.

318 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.


320 There may also be a role for other prophylactic institutional and constitutional design measures aimed at slowing or preventing “abusive constitutionalism.” See generally,
leaders is deemed a symptom and not a cause of populism, some symptoms are themselves so dangerous, harmful, and costly that they must be resisted.

CONCLUSION

The structures through which democratic systems choose their leading candidates to become President or Prime Minister are among the most consequential elements in the institutional design of democracy. These structures influence the kind of candidates who choose to run, the kind of figures likely to be elected, and how the system of democratic governance might tend to function once one of these candidates becomes head of government. Yet these selection structures have largely flown under the radar of democratic theory and much of the scholarship on democratic institutional design. The fundamental choice across democratic systems involves how much weight selection methods give to aspects of peer review, in which elected party leaders have special weight, and to more expansive forms of participation in the process, ranging from a role for party members to even more inclusive selectorates.

With the current alienation from mainstream political parties and the “elites” who lead them that is reflected in democratic politics in many democracies, it can be difficult to see the virtues in selection systems that maintain a significant role for peer review—even though most mature democracies, with the exception of the United States, do retain such a role. Yet one’s perspective on this issue depends heavily on what one considers to be the greatest risks against which democracies need to guard. Back in the early 2000s, it was thought we were living through “the Age of Democracy;”321 during the previous generation a third major wave of democratization had led more new constitutional democracies to be forged than in any comparable historical period.

But the ensuing fifteen years have not been as kind to democracy. Some commentators have gone so far as to claim that democracy is now in retreat in many places around the globe;322 more modestly, others have argued that we must face up to the “democratic reces-

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In particular, the striking and unanticipated rise of authoritarian, populist governments in Hungary, Poland, and Venezuela that, once elected through democratic processes, have sought to use the levers of state power to eliminate effective political competition and insulate one-party rule from meaningful checks and balances, has sounded perhaps the loudest alarm bell about what one of us has called “the inherent authoritarianism in democratic regimes”—the risk that those temporarily holding power in democratic regimes will use that power to entrench themselves from effective political competition through manipulation of electoral rules and suppression of competing sources of checks and balances.

The comparative legal scholars Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq have argued that perhaps the most significant process through which democracies have collapsed is through a path they call “constitutional retrogression.” This is an incremental process, which occurs slowly “through an accumulation of piecemeal changes,” in which political leaders first prevail in the electoral process, then gradually undermine competitive elections, fundamental political rights of speech and association, and the capacity of independent judicial institutions to enforce the rule of law. Yet their helpful analysis does not ask the prior and perhaps much more important question: How do the individual figures who lead these antiliberal, populist movements or parties manage to get into power in the first place—and is there anything in the design of democratic processes that can reduce the risk that such figures will come to power?

This Article should be read against the rise of the populist forces, including illiberal and authoritarian ones of the right and left that are currently roiling numerous long-established democracies. Populist alienation, anger, and hostility toward government and political elites are not unexpected in the aftermath of the financial crisis that began in 2007; as economic historians have shown in studies of democracies going back to 1870, financial recessions—which endure much longer and are therefore more painful than ordinary economic recessions—regularly spawn a rise in populist politics and parties, in left and right

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325 Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 78, 83–84 (2018) (suggesting the “threat of constitutional retrogression may in fact pose a more pressing and consequential challenge” to liberal democracies than a sudden, “wholesale, rapid collapse into authoritarianism”).
326 Id. at 83.
variations. Add to these economic dislocations the cultural challenges posed in many countries by the dramatic rates of increase of immigration in recent years, as well as the opportunities created by the rise of social media, and the challenge to traditional politics and parties is even less surprising. But how directly and immediately these organic political forces get translated and channeled into elections and governance is partly a function of the institutional framework within which democratic politics takes place in different countries.

In the United States, which in the 1970s abandoned almost any formal role for peer review in the selection of the presidential nominees of the major parties, these populist forces can now find immediate and decisive expression through broadly participatory primary elections, which lower the barriers to populist candidates becoming the nominees of one or both of the major parties. In contrast, countries which maintain significant components of peer review in the process of selecting candidates for chief executive contain mediating devices that create mixed systems combining direct popular political input with the judgment of elected party figures. The resulting candidates will reflect a mix of “elite” and “popular” judgments that varies in its precise composition depending on how the contributions of these two elements are combined in a given system. Particularly with the rise of illiberal, authoritarian forms of populism through the electoral process that have come to threaten democracies in recent decades, it is worth questioning whether abandoning any role for peer review in the selection of major party leaders or nominees for chief executive should be celebrated as an unequivocal advance for systems of democratic government.

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328 For the distinctive and important role of social media in the rise of “new populism,” see Ming-Sung Kuo, Against Instantaneous Democracy (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 11, 2017) (on file with authors).