Civil forfeiture is a mechanism by which law enforcement can seize and keep property purportedly connected to a crime absent the arrest, formal charging, or even conviction of the property owner. Forfeiture laws also allow law enforcement to keep a portion, and sometimes all, of the seized property for agency use and, in some jurisdictions, even for the salaries and benefits of law enforcement personnel directly. In the past several decades, forfeiture laws have distorted law enforcement priorities by shifting the focus away from other activities and toward revenue generation. Civil forfeiture illustrates Professor Atuahene’s theory of stategraft: state agents transferring property from residents “to the state in violation of the state’s own laws or basic human rights,” often during times of budgetary austerity. But this Essay identifies important elements of forfeiture that do not comport with the theory. It suggests ways in which the conceptualization of stategraft may be expanded to encompass laws, regulations, and systems that legally, although arguably unjustly, allow or encourage state actors to exploit their fellow residents for the benefit of the bureaucrat’s budget. The Essay concludes with recommendations for reform of civil forfeiture laws and stategraft more generally.