Volume 79, Number 1

April 2004

Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics

Victor Goldfeld

Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional Processes

Federal statutes are enacted that, in whole or in part, have failed to receive even minimal attention from Congress. Because the most obvious solution to this problem-procedura lreform of Congress’s internal legislative rules-has not been forthcoming, Victor Goldfeld attempts to put forth the strongest possible case for a judicial approach to addressing this problem. Drawing on recent Supreme Court decisions, Goldfeld outlines “legislative due process”-a form of judicial review in which courts would examine the legislative process by which federal statutory provisions are enacted to ensure that such provisions received at least a minimal level of congressional deliberation. This would improve the quality of congressional policymaking, and help minimize the ability of special interest groups to game the legislative process. He eschews coming to a firm conclusion on whether legislative due process is a viable model of judicial review, instead providing the reader with a framework for approaching that question.